University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2009

Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax
Gap
Susan C. Morse
UC Hastings College of the Law, smorse@law.utexas.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons
Recommended Citation
Susan C. Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 483 (2009).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/555

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library

Author:

Susan C. Morse

Source:

Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal

Citation:

40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483 (2009).

Title:

Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap

Originally published in LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL. This article is reprinted with
permission from LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW JOURNAL and Loyola University Chicago School
of Law.

Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap
Susan Cleary Morse*

INTRODUCTION

Most small business and self-employed taxpayers cheat on their
taxes. In fact, in the aggregate, they fail to pay about half the tax they
owe to the federal government, and this unpaid tax amounts to roughly
$150 billion annually. This figure is about half of the "tax gap," or the
amount of tax due that the federal government does not collect.
This Article argues that more salient government communications
and greater attention to principles of influence would improve existing
and proposed policies to encourage self-employed and small business
taxpayers to pay their taxes. Reversing widespread tax evasion among
self-employed and small business taxpayers requires changing the
existing social norm of noncompliance, which in turn demands a better
connection between the government's message and the experience of
the taxpayers. Policymakers should recraft their anti-tax-gap messages
so that they grab the attention of the target audience. Policymakers
should also take advantage of established influence tools to leverage
predictable taxpayer heuristics such as conformity to the compliance
behavior of similar peers and availability bias.
This Article contains five parts. Part I describes the details and
limitations of several existing tax-gap-closing approaches relevant to
self-employed and small business taxpayers: third-party reporting, audit,
whistleblower rewards, and gatekeeper strategies. Part II outlines the
concepts of salience and influence and places them in the context of
proposals to address or close the tax gap. Part III considers how
salience and the influence principle of social proof could improve
government messages to taxpayers about taxpaying obligations and
* Teaching Fellow, Santa Clara University School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the
thoughtful comments received from Santa Clara faculty workshop participants, particularly Brad
Joondeph and Pat Cain, and from participants at the 2008 Junior Tax Scholars' Conference,
especially Stephanie Hoffer and Dennis Ventry; and the research assistance of Benjamin Auer,
Santa Clara JD 2008, and his Spring 2007 Tax Policy class paper, which helped spark the
development of this Article.
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audit risks, and to tax preparers about diligence requirements. Part lV
outlines strategies based on the influence principles of reciprocity and
commitment consistency, which could help the government initiate and
maintain productive relationships with taxpayers. Part V points out
several complications that could emerge from government use of such
salience and influence strategies: measurement and cost-benefit
analysis, the uncertain place of such strategies in the budget process,
and the awkwardness of implementing strategies that might involve the
use of stereotypes.
I. EXISTING PROPOSALS TO NARROW THE TAX GAP
A. Who Cheats and Why?
The tax gap data gathered by U.S. Treasury and the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) show that many self-employed and small business
taxpayers cheat on their taxes. For example, the government estimates
that income, employment, and estate tax underpayments by sole
proprietors, who are largely self-employed and small business
taxpayers, made up about fifty percent of the $345 billion gross tax gap
in 2001.1 In addition, such taxpayers pay only about half their taxes.
Non-farm proprietor income has a misreporting rate of fifty-seven
percent which compares to a rate of only one percent for wage income
subject to withholding and information reporting and similarly low rates
for other items subject to at least some reporting. 2 The headline is clear:
individuals with business income evade taxes and make a large
contribution to the tax gap.
I. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT ON IMPROVING
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 12 (Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter IRS 2007 TAX GAP REPORT] (reporting

estimates based on National Research Program (NRP) data). The net tax gap, after audit and
collections activity, amounts to about $290 billion annually. Id. at 1. Tax gap estimates from raw
data are adjusted upward to account for factors including the difficulty of detecting misreporting
of cash income. See Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367, 371 (Oct. 22, 2007)
(explaining that low-visibility income such as sole proprietor income is adjusted upward by a
multiplier of between 3.3 and 4.2). A number of factors feed into the fifty percent calculation,
including individuals' business income tax underreporting ($109 billion), and payroll,
employment, and self-employment tax underreporting ($80 billion). See IRS 2007 TAX GAP
REPORT, supra, at 12-13.

2. See IRS 2007 TAX GAP REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (reporting figures). This report
categorizes items by visibility and concludes that income subject to both reporting and
withholding, such as wages, has a misreporting percentage of only one percent; income subject to
substantial information reporting, such as interest and dividends, has a misreporting percentage of
five percent; items subject to some information reporting, such as partnership income and
deductions, have a misreporting percentage of nine percent; and items subject to little or no
reporting, such as sole proprietor business income, have a much larger rate of misreporting, fiftyfour percent. See id.
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Opportunity provides one important reason for noncompliance

among self-employed and small business taxpayers. Self-employed and
small business taxpayers often receive substantial cash revenue, 3 and
earnings often either lack a third-party reporting requirement or have a
frequently-ignored reporting requirement. 4 Not surprisingly, social
science and empirical studies confirm that income visibility is an
important determinant of tax compliance6 5 and that reporting
requirements significantly reduce tax cheating.

3. See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117
TAX NOTES 506, 506 (Oct. 29, 2007) (distinguishing between cash and non-cash components of
the economy and applicable effective tax rates).
4. Payments made to self-employed and small business taxpayers in the course of the payer's
business are reportable on Form 1099-MISC. See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2006). But there are
significant gaps in reporting. For example, amounts paid by consumers as opposed to businesses
are not reportable under Section 6041, which requires reporting of payments of $600 or more to
"[a]ll persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of such trade or
business to another person." I.R.C. § 6041(a). In addition, determining whether the law requires
the filing of a 1099-MISC and managing the logistics of filing the form can present difficulties.
See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP
SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 6-7, 17-18
(July 2007) [hereinafter GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT] (explaining the inconvenience and
spotty coverage of 1099-MISC reporting). The low $50 penalty for violating Section 6041 may
also contribute to payers' willingness to ignore it. See I.R.C. § 6721 (imposing a $50 penalty for
failure to file an information return and also imposing a penalty of $100 or, if greater, ten percent
of the aggregate amount of the items required to be reported for a failure to file an information
return due to intentional disregard); see also I.R.C. § 6724(d)(l)(A)(i) (defining information
return to include returns required under I.R.C. § 6041(a)).
5. See, e.g., Understanding Taxpayer Compliance: Self-Interest, Social Commitment, and
Other Influences, in TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 71, 112-13 (Jeffrey
A. Roth et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE] (reporting that taxpayers are
more likely to report visible income); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE, 818, 841-43 (1998) (summarizing studies indicating that "noncompliance is
discouraged by a high risk of detection"); Gregory A. Carnes & Ted D. Englebrecht, An
Investigation of the Effect of Detection Risk Perceptions, Penalty Sanctions, and Income Visibility
on Tax Compliance, 17 J. AM. TAX'N ASS'N 26, 39 (1995) (noting that income source strongly
influences the perceived likelihood of detection).
6. For example, a study of 1992 income tax payments concluded that employees reported
99.1% of their wage income subject to withholding, that recipients of interest income subject to
reporting reported 97.7% of such income, that sole proprietors reported 67.7% of their income,
and that informal suppliers such as housepainters and babysitters reported just 18.6% of their
income. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 178 (2d ed. 2001). See generally Maryann Richardson &
Adrian J. Sawyer, A Taxonomy of the Tax Compliance Literature: Further Findings, Problems
and Prospects, 16 AUSTL'N TAX F. 137, 168 (2001) (describing literature showing that income
source is an important tax compliance factor). The likelihood of detection fits comfortably into
the classic economic analysis of taxpayer behavior. This frames a tax compliance decision as a
comparison between (1) the cost of paying tax, and (2) the difference between the benefit of
avoiding the tax and the cost of the imposition of tax, interest, and penalties, risk-adjusted for the
possibility that the government will successfully challenge the tax avoidance strategy and perhaps
adjusted for other factors such as risk aversion. See generally Michael G. Allingham & Agnar
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Social norms can also influence noncompliance. 7 Work by social
scientists specific to the problem of tax compliance has consistently
demonstrated that taxpayers who believe their peers are noncompliant
are less likely to comply themselves. 8 The relationship between group
norms, individual ethics, and taxpayer behavior is complicated. For
example, although it is possible that group norms influence individual

taxpayer compliance decisions, causality could also run the other way,
so that a noncompliant taxpayer might use peer behavior to defend a
9
prior decision not to comply, or might seek out noncompliant peers.

The social norm of noncompliance has such strength for small
business and self-employed taxpayers that the use of the phrase "tax
evasion" to describe their failure to pay tax on unambiguous income

sometimes meets resistance. Some research suggests that these
taxpayers' mental processes do not reflect intentional stealing from the
government, but instead involve mental habits that categorize cash
receipts as belonging fully to the taxpayer, for example, and not partly
to the government. 10 Still, the core noncompliance paradigm explored

in this Article-the nonpayment of tax on cash business incomeplainly meets the statutory definition of tax evasion, and sometimes the

Article refers to it as such.
The image of a misreporting taxpayer as the owner of a corner store
or local construction business may also prompt hesitation about whether
the government should crack down on such taxpayers."l Self-employed
Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A TheoreticalAnalysis,1 J. PUB. ECON. 323-38 (1972).
7. See, e.g., Benno Torgler, Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and
Tax Compliance in Experiments, 16 J. ECON. SURV. 657, 663-66 (2002) (describing studies
connecting group decisionmaking or cultural differences to individual tax compliance decisions).
8. See TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 112-13; Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 6,
at 173-77.
9. See TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 112-13; Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 6,
at 174. However, one study based on longitudinal survey data suggests that a causal link, in
addition to a correlation, exists, and that taxpayers internalize the taxpaying norms of a group
with which the taxpayer strongly identifies. See Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalisation?
CausalRelations Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 46 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491, 50405 (2005). Another recent study comparing taxpayers in different European countries reports a
high correlation between taxpayers' compliance and their perception of others' compliance and
concludes after some statistical analysis that the data suggests that the perception of others'
behavior drives compliance decisions, not the other way around. See Bruno S. Frey & Benno
Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation,35 J. COMP. ECON. 136, 146, 152 (2007).
10. See, e.g., Paul Webley et al., Value Added Tax Compliance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC
FINANCE 175, 182, 187 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006) (noting interview and
survey results suggesting that under some small business owners' mental accounting processes,
VAT revenues come out of the business owner's own funds).
11. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax Shelters, The Cash Economy, and
Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005) ("Many undoubtedly feel that the cash
economy is a less appealing target for increased enforcement than tax shelters."). 2006 survey
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individuals and small business owners operate under a systematic

disadvantage in that they lack economies of scale when paying for
inventory or supplies, health insurance, fixed regulatory costs, and

numerous other items. Moreover, some may provide a local, 'Main
Street' consumption experience that deserves categorization as a
subsidy-deserving public good. 12
However, the roughly fifty percent income tax break that evasion

provides to cash businesses is huge, and underreporting also reduces
employment and sales taxes in many cases. 13 Even if the operation of a
small business is a public good that deserves a subsidy, the existing
government subsidies. (including both significant tax incentives 14 and
nontax programs) 15 do not achieve the desired level of public good, and
the tax system would best implement an additional subsidy, 16 a welldesigned subsidy would be smaller, transparent, and available
regardless of a taxpayer's taste for tax evasion. The current ability of
cash businesses to evade tax presents a large incentive to engage in
results showed that eighty percent of respondents thought it "very important" that corporations
were reporting and paying their taxes honestly; a lower percentage, sixty-eight percent, gave the
same response with respect to small businesses. See IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2006 TAXPAYER
AT7ITUDE SURVEY 3 (2007), available at http://www.treas.govlI.R.S.ob/reports/2006_taxpayer
_attitude.survey.pdf.
12. See Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Casefor Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 42-43 (2006) (noting that numerous tax provisions aim "to correct
for positive externalities").
13. See IRS 2007 TAX GAP REPORT, supra note 1, at II (noting the link between income and
employment tax evasion among sole proprietors). See also Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash
Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., at Part III.B (forthcoming 2009)
(reporting interview results indicating that income, sales, and employment tax evasion moved in
tandem).
14. Incentives on the books include the ability to expense certain depreciable property, see
I.R.C. § 179; a fifty-percent exclusion for certain small business stock gain, see I.R.C. § 1202,
although part of this exclusion is an alternative minimum tax preference, see I.R.C. § 57(a)(7);
ordinary treatment for certain small business stock losses, see I.R.C. § 1244; and the availability
of a pass-through organization as a sole proprietor, partnership, or S corporation to a non-publicly
traded entity. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (permitting business entities that do not meet
the definition of corporation to elect to be taxed as partnerships or disregarded entities). See also
I.R.C. § 1361 (defining an S corporation); § 1362 (permitting S corporation election).
15. For example, the Small Business Administration provides disaster assistance, loan
See N. ERIC WEISS,
guarantees, and some government contract bidding advantages.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: A PRIMER ON
PROGRAMS 3, 5 (2006), available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33243-20060120.pdf.
16. Compare Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 734-35
(1970) (criticizing enactment of tax expenditures for lack of transparency and lack of expertise),
with Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1194-95 (1993) (arguing
that the generalist committees that oversee tax expenditures can better avoid special interest group
capture).
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business in cash, which results in a misallocation of resources to cash
benefit to the owners or
businesses, and perhaps little ultimate
17
employees of evading businesses.
But what government action would work to deter self-employed and
small business taxpayers from underreporting their cash revenues? The
government's September 2006 and August 2007 white papers
recommend a seven-point strategy: reduce evasion opportunity, increase
research, improve information technology, improve audit and related

activities, improve taxpayer service, reform and simplify the law, and
18

coordinate with state and foreign governments and other stakeholders.
Yet only some of these proposals are relevant, and they cannot fully
address the problem.
Although influence tools do not figure prominently on this sevenpoint list, the government implicitly embraces influence strategies at
several points. For example, proposals to improve taxpayer service and

education 19 are important not only as a tool to correct taxpayer
misunderstandings about legal requirements, 20 but also as a reciprocal
influence strategy. 2 1 In addition, Treasury has acknowledged the
potential of audit activity to achieve 2 3broad deterrence, 22 which
implicates tools of publicity and influence.

17. See Bankman, supra note 11, at 7-8 (explaining that the lower effective tax rate for cash
businesses produces lower before-tax wages and lower before-tax investment returns for cash
businesses by encouraging over-investment and over-employment in that sector). But see Joel
Slemrod, Small Business and the Tax System, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 69, 70
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (outlining the argument that lower de facto small
business tax rates offset regressive tax and other compliance costs).
18. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 2-4 (2006) [hereinafter TREASURY 2006 TAX GAP REPORT]
(recommending (1) reducing evasion opportunity through mechanisms including third-party
reporting and more stringent ethical requirements for practitioners; (2) making a multi-year
commitment to research; (3) improving information technology; (4) improving matching, audit
and collection activities; (5) improving taxpayer service; (6) reforming and simplifying the tax
law; and (7) coordinating with state and foreign governments, practitioner groups, and other
stakeholders).
19. See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (including taxpayer service enhancement among its tax gap closing
strategies); see also CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., TAX GAP PLAN: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO
REDUCING CALIFORNIA'S TAX GAP 21 (2006) (setting the goal of "becom[ing] more innovative
in attacking the tax gap").
20. See IRS 2007 TAX GAP REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 ("Service is especially important to
help taxpayers avoid unintentional errors.").
21. See infra Part IV.B (discussing reciprocity).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 122-24 (describing government press releases).
23. See infra Part III.B (discussing publicity of enforcement activities as a social proof tool).
In a somewhat similar vein, the GAO has suggested sending targeted "soft notices" to selfemployed and small business taxpayers who may have potential compliance issues, but whom the
government does not plan to audit. See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 59
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Finally, the National Taxpayer Advocate, Nina Olson, has included
serious consideration of behavioral factors relevant to tax compliance in
her office's research program.
For example, Professor Marjorie
Kornhauser wrote a chapter in the office's 2007 annual report in which
she recommended that the IRS create a group to research tax morale and
implement tactics including taxpayer education and multifaceted
publicity campaigns. 24 But neither the Treasury nor the IRS has
publicly adopted such policies.
Despite these nods to influence strategies, most policymakers do not
25
appear to think systematically about compliance norm development.
In particular, salience and influence strategies are not usually featured
as a centerpiece of the tax-gap-closing proposals made by other
commentators. This Article aims to help fill that gap by considering
specific salience and influence ideas to enhance and supplement
existing tax-gap-closing proposals. But first, the remainder of this Part
outlines several other proposals relevant to the issue of cash business
tax evasion: expanded third-party reporting; better audit selection
strategies facilitated by information technology and partnerships with
other governments; whistleblower or qui tam provisions; and gatekeeper
26
strategies aimed at tax preparers.
B. Third-Party Reporting
Currently, the statutory requirement to report certain payments to
independent contractors on Form 1099 constitutes the main third-party
reporting mechanism for income earned by small business or selfemployed taxpayers. 27 Some tax-gap-closing proposals recommend
(listing pros and cons of sending such soft notices). The GAO's suggestion to communicate that
taxpayers should "recheck ... filed tax returns or change . . . reporting on future returns" also
appears to aim to increase taxpayers' perception of the likelihood of audit. Id.
24. See Marjorie Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance:
Literature Review and Recommendationsfor the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 NAT'L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2008) 138, 157-58 (summarizing
recommendations on tax morale).
25. Some contributions from IRS researchers do seriously consider behavioral issues. See,
e.g., Sagit Leviner, An Overview: A New Era of Tax Enforcement-From "Big Stick" to
Responsive Regulation, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 360, 365 (2008).
26. The proposal to reform and simplify the tax code is not relevant to the unambiguous
problem of failing to report cash income. See Bankman, supra note 11, at 8 ("[Tihe evasion [by
cash businesses] is not-how shall I put this-subtle. It involves false books, false reporting,
safety deposits full of cash, and so on."). The proposal for additional research, although it has not
yet generated a concrete set of proposals, is relevant here insofar as this Article attempts to build
on existing tax compliance research.
27. See I.R.C. § 6041 (requiring reporting by "persons engaged in a trade or business" to
certain recipients, including individuals, of $600 or more annually). See also Treas. Reg. §
1.6041-3(p) (2006) (providing that payments to corporations and various other entities do not
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extending third-party reporting to new categories of self-employment
28

and small business income, such as payments to corporations,

payments by consumers 29 or governments, 30 or payments totaling less

than $600 annually. 3 1 Another idea is to require line-item listing of
items subject to third-party reporting requirements on tax returns to
facilitate automated matching by the government. 32 A third category of

reporting proposals would require firms that process payments, such as
credit card companies, eBay and other online brokers, and banks, to
33
report them.

Third-party reporting proposals

aim to eliminate

taxpayers'

opportunities to omit revenue from taxable income, consistent with data
demonstrating that taxpayers pay tax on reported items of income at
rates in excess of ninety percent. 34 But there are at least three problems

with additional third-party reporting. First, its costs are perceived to
exceed its benefits. Second, and partly as a result of the first issue, there
appears to be little political will to enact sweeping third-party reporting
requirements. Third, there is likely no popular or political appetite for
restricting the use of traceless cash in transactions.

require reporting under Section 6041).
28. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2008 REVENUE PROPOSALS 63 (2007) [hereinafter 2008
BLUEBOOK] (proposing such reporting to corporations and estimating a resulting revenue gain of
$7.7 billion over ten years).
29. See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 51-52 (discussing a proposal to
require reporting by consumers); Bankman, supra note 3, at 509, 512-13 (noting that an
Australian consumer reporting initiative failed in the face of popular objections); Joshua
Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax Gap: BehavioralOptions, 117 TAX NOTES 517, 523-24 (Oct. 29,
2007) (discussing consumer reporting).
30. See 2008 BLUEBOOK, supra note 28, at 69 (proposing requiring governments to report all
non-wage payments made in exchange for property and services, with a revenue estimate of $390
million over ten years).
31. See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 48-49 (discussing a proposal to
require reporting of amounts under $600).
32. See id. at 48 (discussing proposal to break out gross receipts sums on sole proprietor tax
returns). See also Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Treasury Expects Billions From Credit
Card Reporting Proposal, 115 TAX NOTES 890, 891 (June 4, 2007) (noting that automatic
matching of income items reported by third parties requires separate listing on tax returns).
33. See I.R.C. § 6050W (requiring reporting of payments processed by a "third party network"
or by a bank through a credit or debit card arrangement); Notice 2009-19, 2009 I.R.B. LEXIS 106
(noting the law's effective date of January 1,2011).
34. See supra note 2 (citing compliance figures). As Professor Leandra Lederman has noted,
third-party reporting is the most visible of a number of ways, including certain subtle structural
ways, in which third parties support tax compliance. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed
Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698-99 (2007)
(discussing the enforcement benefits that merit better treatment for third-party verified items such
as reimbursed expenses).
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With respect to the cost-benefit point, potential third-party payers
have strenuously argued that reporting proposals could generate

significant costs for initial system overhauls as well as significant
ongoing expenses. The large institutional third-party payers targeted by
the legislative proposals in the administration's 2008 budget objected
that the expected benefits did not merit compliance costs, 35 causing

Treasury officials to retreat from the proposals. 36 In addition, for large
and small potential reporters, information reporting is a complicated and
confusing exercise requiring difficult determinations, like whether a
service provider is an employee or an independent contractor, 3 7 possibly
38
implicating privacy concerns.
The revenue estimates that have accompanied recent third-party
reporting proposals also suggest that these costs, may not result in
significant additional tax revenues. For example, the seven information
reporting proposals in the Bush administration's 2008 budget taken
together would generate only $30 billion over ten years, or less than one
35. See, e.g., Statement of Timothy J. McCormally, Executive Director of Tax Executives
Institute, Inc., before the IRS Oversight Board, Mar. 7, 2007, at 5 (arguing that expanding thirdparty reporting would impose significant time, financial, and "intrusion" burdens, including
changes to information systems, on large corporate payers that are themselves compliant and that
costs and benefits should be weighed, compensation considered, and the IRS ability to use the
information demonstrated); Martin Vaughan, Ebay Battling Treasury Demands For Internet Sales
Info, CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 9, 2007 (reporting that eBay believed the online auction reporting
provision would impose extremely burdensome compliance costs).
36. See Dustin Stamper, Simplification Trumps Bush Administration'sSolutions at I.R.S. Tax
Gap Forum, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 9, 2007, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (search
"2007 TNT 48-5") ("'Maybe we have gotten some of these [information reporting and related
proposals] wrong' he said. 'Maybe we've misguided the impact of some of them."') (quoting
IRS Commissioner Mark Everson); Dustin Stamper, Implementing Bush Budget Could Cost New
I.R.S. $20 Billion Per Year by 2010, Says Everson, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 14, 2007, available
at http://www.lexisnexis.com (search "2007 TNT 32-2") ("'Let's do [the measures proposed in
the 2008 budget] and then see where our stomach is,' Everson said. 'Already we're into
arguments where people are screaming about how much burden and how unfair some of these
steps will be."').
37. See GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 7 ("To determine independent
contractor status, payers are to use 20 common law rules."); Bankman, supra note 3, at 512-13
(discussing compliance burden for consumers if required to report payments to gardeners and
other service providers and recommending a tax credit as partial reimbursement).
38. For example, expanding the merchant card reporting proposal to require banks and Paypal
to report the payments they process, as the GAO has suggested, see GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR
REPORT, supra note 4, at 50, presents a personal privacy concern, since individuals receive
personal, nontaxable payments such as gifts and reimbursements for personal expenses, through
their personal bank and Paypal accounts. See J.C. Santos, Analyzing the Treasury Proposal for
Reporting by Merchant Banks 14 (Apr. 27, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
A properly structured reporting system would reliably exclude such untaxable receipts, perhaps
by requiring separate business and personal accounts and taxpayer identification numbers. See
GAO SOLE PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 50 (noting that separate accounts and TINs
would facilitate reporting by financial institutions).
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percent on average of the $345 billion gross annual tax gap. 3 9 The low

revenue estimates may result at least in part from taxpayers' existing
tendency to report more visible income, including income that a large
40
third party knows about.
One expanded reporting proposal, the requirement to report securities

basis, became law in October 2008 as part of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008.41
The Bush administration, apparently
sensing a lack of political will to enact sweeping third-party reporting
requirements, did not provide Congress a continued stream of new
third-party reporting proposals. The set of reporting proposals in the
Bush Administration's 2009 budget included fewer items than in 2008;
it included the securities basis and merchant card proposals, for
example, but not the expansion of broker reporting to online
42
merchants.
Finally, even if sweeping third-party reporting were implemented in
the United States, there is even less political and popular appetite for
provisions that would marginalize the use of cash. Despite the
experience of some other governments, 4 3 measures such as limiting
deductions for cash transactions, providing tax incentives for credit card
39.

See Lori Montgomery, Narrowing Tax Gap Called 'Unrealistic', WASH. POST, Apr. 19,

2007, at D3. The $30 billion figure included some measures relevant to small businesses, such as
requiring credit card companies to report aggregate annual payments processed to merchants over
$600 (scored at about $10.7 billion over ten years), requiring online brokers such as eBay to
report transactions for customers where the total transactions exceed 100 and the total proceeds
amount to at least $5000 (scored at about $2 billion over ten years), and requiring information
reporting on payments to corporations, including S corporations (scored at about $7.7 billion over
ten years). It also included some proposals not relevant to the problem of tax evasion by small
business, such as the proposal to require basis reporting on security sales (scored at about $6.7
billion over ten years).
40. See supra note 5 (citing sources in support of the link between ease of detection and
income reporting); Morse et al., supra note 13, at text accompanying notes 53-54 (reporting that
interviewed cash business owners tended to report credit and debit card receipts but noting that
the government might use credit card receipt information to target audits at taxpayers with
lopsided ratios of reported credit card receipts to reported cash receipts).
41. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3798
(codified at I.R.C. § 6045(g) (2008)).
42. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2009 REVENUE PROPOSALS 63-69 (2008) [hereinafter 2009 BLUEBOOK] (listing

reporting proposals).
43. See Bankman, supra note 3, at 510 (noting that countries including South Korea,
Argentina, Costa Rica, Columbia, Mexico, and Uruguay have subsidized merchant card use);
Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Technology and Taxation in Developing Countries:From Hand
to Mouse 9 (July 4, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract= 1086853 (reporting that in an attempt to reduce the use of untraceable cash, India allows

a tax deduction of only eighty percent of most current cash expenses and that Korea encourages
the use of credit cards by, for example, permitting a tax deduction equal to twenty percent of
credit card expenses).

HeinOnline -- 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 492 2008-2009

2009]

Using Salience and Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap

493

use, requiring non-cash electronic transactions or permitting close
government monitoring of personal bank accounts would likely be
inconsistent with popular sensibilities and perhaps would raise
constitutional issues. 44 Although credit and debit card transactions are
45
on the rise, cash still plays an important role in consumer commerce.
And if we are unwilling to give up untraceable cash transactions, many
third-party reporting proposals present the problem that cash may be
substituted and reporting requirements easily avoided.4 6
C. Audit
Other tax gap closing techniques seek to improve the audit and
Using enforcement to improve taxpayer
collections process.
compliance is an important strategy. 4 7 It is particularly important for
blatantly noncompliant taxpayers such as tax-evading cash businesses,
as a strong noncompliance norm may require a particularly strong
countering audit signal. 4 8 Even those who believe that both cooperation

44. The First Amendment's right to free expression is one relevant constitutional protection.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, No. 07-GJ-04, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86563 (W.D. Wis. June 26, 2007) (refusing to enforce government subpoena
requesting Amazon.com to reveal the identities of 120 buyers who purchased books from an
individual who allegedly evaded taxes on the proceeds of the sales, based on the First
Amendment rights of the buyers and the possibility that subpoena enforcement would chill bookbuying activity on the Internet).
45. Cash use in the U.S. is concentrated in retail sale transactions. Although credit and debit
cards have eroded the use of cash, it remains an important form of payment. One study puts the
use of cash in 2000 at twenty percent of consumer payments, down from thirty-one percent in
1974, and reports that the use of credit and debit cards rose from thirteen percent to twenty-seven
percent over the same period, while check use fell from fifty-six percent to forty-six percent. See
David B. Humphrey, Replacement of Cash by Cards in U.S. Consumer Payments, 56 J. ECON. &
Bus. 211,223 (2004) (reporting results).
46. Professor Leandra Lederman has developed a framework intended to guide the analysis of
third-party reporting proposals. Her approach considers several factors, including whether the
reporting party acts at arm's length, is centralized, and has a sufficient bookkeeping
infrastructure; whether the government will have the information required for matching to tax
returns; whether taxpayers can easily substitute another arrangement not subject to reporting; and
whether the transaction targeted for reporting contributes significantly to the tax gap. See
Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information
Reporting Warranted 6-8 (Indiana Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law-Bloomington, Legal Stud. Res.
Paper No. 126, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1347668. The framework might not
support wholesale debit and credit card reporting due to the problem of cash substitution. See id.
at 24-26.
47. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1509-10 (2003) (noting that increased audits could prompt
the development of an improved compliance norm).
48. See id.; see, e.g., Edward McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861,
1916 (1994) (noting that the ingrained use of individual tax shelters in the 1970s and 1980s may
have required the overbroad hammer of the passive activity loss rules).
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and punishment are important tools think
that punishment is an
49
evaders.
tax
habitual
to
response
appropriate
Several elements feed into improved audit processes, including
electronic systems to improve document matching, cooperation with
state authorities that may have relevant information from sales tax
audits or other sources, better funding for audit and collections, and
better audit selection based on expanded research.
Improved
technology and resource allocation might improve IRS collection
productivity, 50 and figures indicate in any case that additional resources
could produce some easy collections 51 and, through the "indirect audit
52
effect," fuel a significant positive increase in voluntary compliance.
Unfortunately, the necessary additional audit resources may not be
available any time soon, 53 in part because of public and political
discomfort with increased audit rates and in part because the IRS has
begun, even while raising the audit rate, to shift some resources to
computerized processing of tax data. 54 Moreover, despite serious recent
efforts to increase the individual audit rate, it remains vanishingly
small-i.03% for the fiscal year ending in September 2007, including

49. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing limits of responsive or cooperative
tax regulation).
50. Cf William J. Hunter & Michael A. Nelson, An I.R.S. Production Function, 49 NAT'L
TAX J. 105, 113-14 (1996) (concluding based on an econometric model and empirical data that
technology investment and reassigning employees from the National Office to the field would
improve IRS productivity); Dave Rifkin, An Overview of the "Tax Gap," TAXES, Nov. 2008, at
27, 29-30 (explaining that the IRS mistakenly pursues high-dollar cases and lets small-dollar
cases languish until so much interest has accrued that they are no longer easily collectible).
51. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, LR.S. Enlists Help in Collecting Delinquent Taxes Despite
the Higher Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, at 12 (citing Charles Rossotti's statement,
confirmed by IRS personnel, that more than $9 billion could be collected at a cost of three cents
on the dollar). This figure does not complete the cost-benefit analysis, as the payment of taxes to
the government represents not an increase in economic activity, but rather a transfer that
hopefully promotes a more efficient and equitable tax system. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON
BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 183 (3d ed.
2004) (noting that increased tax revenue does not represent increased economic activity).
However, three cents on the dollar is a good starting place.
52. Estimates of the indirect positive impact of audits on voluntary compliance include 11.6
times the amount of the actual audit adjustments, see ALAN H. PLUMLEY, I.R.S. PUBLICATION
1916: THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: ESTIMATING THE
IMPACTS OF TAX POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIVENESS 35 (1996), and 15 times

that amount, see Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer
Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 521 (2007) (providing figures for simulation involving a
hypothetical doubling of the audit rate).
53. See Johnston, supra note 51 (noting that Congressional reluctance to authorize additional
IRS funding necessitated the hiring of private collection agencies).
54. See Bankman, supra note 3, at 514-15 (describing IRS resource shift and public opinion
against audits).
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correspondence and face-to-face audits. 55 Even a large budget increase
and better audit selection would not raise the audit rate to a significant
percentage.
D. Whistleblower and Qui Tam Provisions
As others have argued, the expansion of whistleblower and qui tam

56
provisions has potential as a tool for building tax compliance norms.
Under the whistleblower statute, as amended in 2006, citizens who
inform the government about tax violations can collect between fifteen

and thirty percent of the resulting tax collections. 57 The whistleblower

program has had some success 58 and attracted some publicity. 59 The
salience and influence communication strategies outlined below could

further expand public knowledge of the program. This would contribute
to its success, which depends on the initiative of whistleblowers.
E. Gatekeeper Regulation

A large body of academic literature explores the concept of using
gatekeepers such as lawyers, accountants, or tax preparers to regulate
the conduct of their clients. 60 According to one survey, eighty-eight

55. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE
STATISTICs
3 (2008)
[hereinafter
IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2007]
available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/irs _enforcement and servicetablesfy_2007.pdf. The 2007
coverage rate is 1.77% for individuals with income $100,000 and higher, 2.87% for individuals
with income $200,000 and higher, and 9.25% for individuals with income $1 million and higher.
See id. at 3-4.
56. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy and How
We Can Make Them Sane, 15 VA. TAX REV. 155, 204-18 (1996) (discussing solutions for
increasing compliance and communication); see also Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Whistleblowers and
Qui Tamfor Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357 (2008) (examining the IRS whistleblower program).
57. See I.R.C. § 7623(b)(I) (2006).
58. See, e.g., Ventry, supra note 56, at 361-62 (reporting on the success of the 2006
whistleblower amendments).
59. See, e.g., Press Release, IRS Oversight Board, IRS and Oversight Board Discuss LongTerm Measures and IRS Workforce Initiative at September Meeting (Sept. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/press-posting09162008.shtml (reporting that the 2006 statute has
"yielded higher-dollar cases" including cases in the first eight months of 2008 from more than
800 whistleblowers who allege $2 million or more in unpaid taxes); Tom Herman, Whistleblower
Law Scores Early Success, Higher Rewards Attract Informants Submitting Tips, WALL ST. J.,
May 16, 2007, at D3 (reporting that the IRS received important tips from informants hoping to
cash in on the law offering sharply higher rewards in cases involving large amounts of tax
cheating).
60. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
FashioningRelevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 349-53 (2004) (proposing better alignment
of gatekeeper and shareholder corporate governance incentives through regulatory strict liability);
see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) (introducing the gatekeeper regulation concept).
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percent of small businesses use a paid tax preparer or accountant to
prepare their federal income tax returns. 6 1 This large percentage might
indicate that gatekeeper regulation could significantly improve this
group's tax compliance. However, as discussed below, most gatekeeper
provisions seem unlikely to have a significant impact on the problem of
cash revenue-related tax evasion by self-employed and small business

taxpayers.
Gatekeeper measures intended to improve deterrence of aggressive
tax planning or outright tax cheating include raising return filing
63
standards and disclosure requirements, 62 reducing privilege,
61.

See NAT'L FED'N OFINDEP. Bus., NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS POLL: COMPLEXITY AND

THE I.R.S. 6 (2006) [hereinafter NFIB 2006 SURVEY] (reporting average results for firms with 1250 employees).
62. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards

and Denying Evidentiary Privilege, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 638 (2006) (summarizing a proposal
to raise return filing standard to "more-likely-than-not"); Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice
Cases and Their Implicationsfor Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 301-03, 307 (2008)

(arguing that successful tax shelter malpractice litigation illustrates the value of disclosure
requirements and government access to taxpayer information). The Small Business and Work
Opportunity Act of 2007 adopted an increased return filing standard for purposes of tax preparer
penalties, see I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2006) (providing more-likely-than-not return preparer standard),
although some criticize the new standard, see, e.g., Jonathan S. Brenner, New Standardfor Tax
Return Positions Is Inappropriate,116 TAX NOTES 559 (Aug. 13, 2007) (criticizing the amended
Section 6694). Proposed regulations under Circular 230 would make the regulatory standard of
practice the same as the statutory standard. See Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 54540 (proposed Sept. 24, 2007) (to be codified at 31
C.F.R. § 10.34(a), (e)) (requiring that return positions are supported either by a reasonable belief
that the position is more likely than not to be sustained if challenged or by a reasonable basis
disclosed to the IRS).
63. See Beale, supra note 62, at 638 (proposing to remove attorney-client privilege protection
for pre-filing advice). Privilege in the tax context stems from the common law attorney-client
privilege, see 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 503.10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2008), and from the
statutory tax practitioner privilege, see I.R.C. § 7525 (2006). Recently courts have narrowed the
scope of privilege, for example, holding that there is no privilege when the tax advisor prepares a
tax return or when tax advice is offered as part of a marketing package. See United States v.
Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.) (stating that nothing in Section 7525
"suggests that these nonlawyer practitioners are entitled to privilege when they are doing other
than lawyers' work"); Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627, 637 (W.D.N.C. 2003)
(finding no privilege for Jenkens & Gilchrist or KPMG where advice was embedded in identical
tax shelter packages when they are doing other than lawyers' work"). The availability of work

product protection continues to depend on a more general balancing test that considers the
strength of the claim that the material was developed in anticipation of litigation and the
importance of the material to the requesting litigant's case. See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL.,
STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 306.4.4.2, at 304 (6th ed. 2004) (describing the balancing test).
As privilege claims become less promising, practitioners may increasingly rely on work product.
See, e.g., United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 153-55 (D.R.I. 2007), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, No. 07-2631, 2009 WL 136752 (1st Cir. Jan. 21, 2009) (denying IRS petition to
enforce summons for taxpayer workpapers based on work product doctrine). However, some
argue that work product protection is inappropriate for documents such as workpapers prepared in
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increasing penalties, 64 tightening ethical standards and disciplinary
procedure,6 5 imposing additional licensing requirements,6 6 and
a tax regulatory context rather than in connection with a tax controversy. See Dennis J. Ventry
Jr., ProtectingAbusive Tax Avoidance, 120 TAX NOTES 857, 871-83 (Sept. 1,2008).
64. See, e.g., James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old 'Brine' in New Bottles,
55 TAX L. REV. 135, 163 (2002) (recommending tougher Circular 230 sanctions). Recent
statutory developments have, in fact, increased some penalties. For example, strict liability
penalties for violation of the new Section 6694 "more-likely-than-not" standard are set at the
greater of $5,000 or fifty percent of the tax preparer's compensation with respect to the return.
I.R.C. § 6694(b)(1). Prior law set this "first-tier" penalty at $250. See JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE "SMALL BUSINESS AND WORK OPPORTUNITY
TAX ACT OF 2007" AND PENSION RELATED PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 2206 (2007). A
final Circular 230 provision also gives the IRS the authority, consistent with a statutory provision
enacted in 2004, see American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(a), 118
Stat. 1418 (2004) § 822(a), to impose a monetary penalty up to the amount of gross income to be
derived from the relevant conduct, see Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.50(c) (2008).
Other provisions enacted by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 target gatekeepers in an
effort to combat tax shelters. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6111(b) (2000) (requiring "material advisors" to
file statements describing "reportable transactions"); id. § 6112(a) (requiring such advisors to
keep investor lists); id. § 6707(b)(1) (imposing penalties of $50,000 for failure to disclose
reportable transactions and higher penalties for failure to disclose listed transactions); id. §
6708(a)(1) (imposing $10,000 per day penalty for failure to provide investor list on request).
Finally, the Bush Administration's 2008 budget proposal included a provision that would increase
the monetary penalty for failures such as failure to sign a return, failure to furnish a preparer TIN,
failure to retain a copy of a return, or failure to file a correct information return. The existing
penalty is $50 for a strict liability failure, $250 if the preparer knew or reasonably should have
known of the failure, and $1000 if the failure is due to willful, reckless or intentional disregard of
the rules. The proposal would increase the penalties from $50 to $150, from $250 to the greater
of $1000 or fifty percent of the preparer's fee, and from $1000 to the greater of $5000 or fifty
percent of the preparer's fee. See 2008 BLUEBOOK, supra note 28, at 80 (outlining existing law
and proposal).
65. See, e.g., Soled, supra note 62, at 290-96 (recommending stronger and better-enforced
ethical standards). In 2003, the IRS created the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) as an
expanded effort to oversee tax professionals. IRS News Release IR-2003-3 (Dec. 16, 2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroonlarticle/O,,id=105533,00.htm.
The IRS has tried to
strengthen the OPR. For example, it proposed opening Circular 230 disciplinary proceedings to
the public. Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 71 Fed. Reg.
6421 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (to be codified at 31 CFR § 10.72(d)). Final regulations, however,
required only publication of final reports and decisions. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.72(d)
(2008); see also T.D. 9359, 2007-45 C.B. 10 (2007) (explaining concern that practitioners'
reputations would unfairly suffer from premature disclosure of hearings).
66. See, e.g., S. 832, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (listing return preparer provision including an
exam requirement and recertification of eligibility every three years); see also NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 197 (2007) (recommending certification
program and explaining that "untrained and unscrupulous preparers present a serious problem");
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX PREPARERS: OREGON'S REGULATORY REGIME MAY
LEAD TO IMPROVED FEDERAL TAX RETURN ACCURACY AND PROVIDES A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR
NATIONAL REGULATION 25 (2008) (suggesting that Oregon's regulation of tax preparers,
including challenging examinations, might provide a national model). However, the government
recently chose not to finalize a more limited provision targeted at unlicensed return preparers.
See T.D. 9359, supra note 65 (explaining that proposed regulation that would have barred
unenrolled preparers from representing clients before the IRS even in cases where they had
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modifying tax preparers' investigation obligations. 67 Recent statutory
amendments, 68 judicial developments, 69 and changes to Circular 23070
implement some of these gatekeeper-targeted proposals. However, few
such ideas have relevance for tax preparers assisting self-employed and
small business taxpayers with significant cash revenue.
For example, provisions targeted at adjusting return filing standards
and disclosure requirements have little relevance to the unambiguous
problem of underreporting cash income. Likewise, reductions in
attorney-client or work product privilege do not affect most selfemployed and small business taxpayers. These doctrines have never
protected the advice of most tax preparers who advise cash businesses
because such preparers are generally71 not lawyers, and tax preparation
does not constitute protected advice.
Unlike filing standards and privilege, increased practitioner penalties
and tougher disciplinary proceedings could be important tools for
increasing compliance among self-employed and small business
taxpayers. Thus, the increase in penalties under the 2007 amendments
to section 669472 might well reduce tax preparers' willingness to
cheat-except that they appear to be protected under current law if they
can reasonably claim to be unaware of their clients' unreported income.
If a tax preparer prepares a return for a cash business client that omits
significant income, the tax preparer faces penalties only if the diligence
rules attribute knowledge of that income to the preparer.
The 2006 amendments to section 6694 did not change the knowledge
standard for purposes of the statutory return preparer penalty. The
inquiry remains whether "the tax return preparer knew (or reasonably
should have known) of the position," 73 and the standard for avoiding
penalties remains "reasonable cause for the understatement and [that the
tax preparer] acted in good faith." 74 The analogous Circular 230
prepared the contested tax return was not finalized).
67. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (2000) (providing that no tax preparer penalty is due if "there is
reasonable cause for the understatement and [the preparer] acted in good faith"); Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-2(e)(4) (2008) (describing the "good faith" standard to include consideration of the actual
knowledge of the preparer and whether the preparer's normal procedures promote accuracy and
include "methods for obtaining necessary information from the taxpayer").
68. See supra notes 62 and 64 (describing statutory changes relating to return filing standards
and increasing penalties).
69. See supra note 63 (describing judicial decisions restricting privilege).
70. See supra notes 62 and 64-65 (describing changes to Circular 230),
71. See supra note 63 (commenting on privilege law).
72. See supra note 64 (describing new penalties).
73. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2) (2000).
74. Id.
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provision, which states that a practitioner's responsibility to ensure that
a client's return is accurate consists of using reasonable care in a due
diligence process, also remains unchanged.75
Existing guidance
interpreting these provisions indicates
that
preparers
may generally rely
76
on taxpayer-provided information.
The relevant guidance includes language that could be considered to
require a tax preparer to ask questions about cash revenue in order to
avoid penalties: "[T]he tax return preparer, however, may not ignore the
implications of information furnished to the tax return preparer or
actually known by the tax return preparer." 77 But the few examples do
not portray a tax preparer who inquires about the big picture, for
instance by asking how the client's business success, cash revenue
experience, and lifestyle fit together. Instead, the examples present
situations involving the question of whether the preparer had a specific
reason to know about a particular income item.
The guidance permits a preparer to avoid violation by asking
questions in a way that telegraphs that so long as she does not know
about a taxpayer's other income, it will not be necessary to include it on
the tax return she prepares. A preparer might ask, for example, "So I
assume these records you've given me list all the revenue, right?" At
least some research suggests that many preparers take the second "don't
ask, don't tell" approach.78
Possible additional measures targeted at preparers and better-tailored
to the problem that preparers now have the safe option of "indifference"
to their clients' taste for tax evasion exist, as Professor Leslie Book
pointed out in the 2008 Taxpayer Advocate report. 79 Such measures
include more stringent and specific due diligence requirements 80 and
improved data collection about preparers through such steps as uniform
use of preparer identification numbers, bar coding of preparer returns
and computer sifting of data to identify trends such as high refunds

75. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.22(a) (2008) (stating a due diligence requirement).
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e)(1) (2008) (requiring reasonable inquiries if furnished
information "appears to be incorrect or incomplete").
77. Id.
78. See Morse et al., supra note 13, at Part II.E.3 (reporting that according to series of
information interviews, many practitioners appear to have a "don't ask, don't tell" norm that
supports their clients' underreporting).
79. See Leslie Book, The Need to Increase Preparer Responsibility, Visibility and
Competence, in 2 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 74, 81
(2009) (describing types of tax preparers).

80. See id. at 86-88 (recommending changes to due diligence requirements).
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traced to preparers. 8 1 These approaches would be most effective if
accompanied by effective publicity.

II.

SALIENCE AND INFLUENCE

Existing tax gap proposals, such as expanded third-party reporting,
increased audit activity, and increased gatekeeper penalties and
responsibilities make some sense, but as currently conceived they are
incomplete. Salient and influential communication strategies can
provide help. This Part describes what is meant by salience and

influence in the context of promoting tax compliance.
The concepts of salience and influence as they relate to the
formulation of tax and other public policies emerge from behavioral
8 3 and behavioral public finance. 84
economics, 82 critical realism,
Salience here means relevance, prominence and accessibility. A salient
communication grabs the attention of the audience. One way in which
salience influences tax politics, for example, is that politicians may find
that voters appreciate efforts to reduce prominent or salient taxes, like
the individual income tax, more than hidden taxes like the corporate
income tax. 85 Salience is also relevant to the relationship between the
IRS and the taxpaying public because taxpayers give more attention and

focus to more salient IRS communications.
Influence as used here means persuasion, typically through methods
that do not rely on logic or argument. A communication may prompt a
certain reaction because it activates a certain behavior pattern or
heuristic. 86 But this does not necessarily make it influential as the term
81.

See id. at 88-91 (describing measures to increase preparer visibility).

82.

See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.

L. REV. 1471, 1537 (1998) (recommending that prescriptive legal solutions "exploit salience").
83. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist

Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. J. 1,32-33,43 (2004) (explaining that even though
we often experience our interior cognitive processes as rational, "interior situation" and external
manipulations can strongly influence that cognition). Hanson and Yosifon comment that due to
the "interior fundamental attribution error," factors that we do not experience as salient can have
significant influence; we are not aware, in many cases, what it is that drives us to a particular
action. Id. at 31-32. I do not mean to challenge their observation about the importance of nonsalient internal factors here, though I focus on external factors with salience and influence.
84. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public
Finance, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 10 (outlining the project of connecting

analyses of individual "heuristics and biases" to "normative public finance" and noting that social
norms and other factors outside the economic actor model contribute to tax compliance
decisions).
85.

See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL., PUB.

POL'Y & L. 106, 119-20 (2006) (noting taxpayer aversion to increases in the salient individual
income tax).
86. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
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A person making an

influential communication crafts it to take advantage of a particular
87
behavior pattern or heuristic to produce a desired result.
Other commentators have considered the use of tools of influence to

improve tax compliance in various circumstances. Some recommend,
for example, appeals to taxpayers' sense of morals or social
obligation. 8 8 Others focus on the desirability of "responsive" or
"cooperative" tax compliance efforts, in which the government and
taxpayers establish a tit-for-tat partnership marked by the government's
provision of useful and accessible services to the taxpayer and the
89
taxpayer's honesty with the government.
One challenge in the case of self-employed and small business
taxpayers and the tax gap is that the audience includes many habitual
evaders. 90 Even cooperation advocates agree that punishment remains
an appropriate response to "dedicated cheaters," 9 1 and thus a
communication plan should direct a punishment message to this group.
But other taxpayers may be willing to engage in a cooperative
relationship with the government, and effective communication to this
group should deliver a message that the government stands ready to

Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1106, 1179 (2004) ("[Clues that are
prominent or catch our attention are more likely to activate associated categories and schemas.").
87. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE ix, 8-9 (4th ed. 2001)
(noting the automatic reactions that advertisers and other "compliance professionals" can
prompt).
88. See, e.g., Eugene Bardach, Moral Suasion and Taxpayer Compliance, "11L. & POL'Y 49,
49, 61 (1989) (listing several authors who recommend "'moral appeals,"' including fairness to
one's fellow taxpayer and to improve tax compliance); Trivedi et al., Impact of Personal and
SituationalFactors on Taxpayer Compliance:An Experimental Analysis, 47 J. BUS. ETHICS 175,
179 (2003) (recommending that standard punishment-based enforcement be supplemented with
information about other taxpayers' compliance, tax fairness, and appeals to taxpayers moral and
social conscience).
89. See, e.g., Leviner, supra note 25, at 11-15 (praising the Australian tax authorities' tit-fortat responsive regulation strategy); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 431, 436 (2009). Both Leviner and Ventry rely in part on the extensive work done in
Australia on responsive tax regulation. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax
Compliance, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1-11
(2003); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102
MICH. L. REV. 71, 83-84 (2003) (suggesting that governments should encourage reciprocal
compliance behavior by emphasizing other taxpayers' compliance rather than the possibility of
audit).
90. The evasion of tax on cash income, as Professor Bankman has observed, "is not .
subtle." Bankman, supra note 11, at 8.
91. Kahan, supra note 89, at 83-84; see also Leviner, supra note 25, at 15-16 (describing a
tit-for-tat strategy); Ventry, supra note 89, at 446-47 ("[T]he feedback provided by a reciprocal
approach can help tax authorities identify noncompliant taxpayers and respond with harsher
penalties, aggressive enforcement, regular audits, and ongoing monitoring.").
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reciprocate. For example, if, as Professor Alex Raskolnikov suggests,
the government were to require taxpayers to choose between a
"deterrence regime" targeted at gainers and a "compliance regime"
targeted at good-faith taxpayers, salient and influential communications
should not only inform taxpayers of the choice, but also build the
credibility of the compliance option by persuading them of the

government's ability and willingness
to participate in a good-faith
92
cooperative regulatory relationship.

Professor Marjorie Kornhauser recognized the diversity among
taxpayers' motivations and learning styles when she recommended

incorporating behavioral compliance research into IRS policy in the
2007 Taxpayer Advocate report. She also acknowledged the difficulty
of translating behavioral research into tax policy. Her proposal includes

establishing a multidisciplinary behavioral science research division
within the IRS, building a multifaceted understanding of tax morale that

acknowledges the many differences among taxpayers, and launching
diverse education and media campaigns aimed in part at improving tax
morale. 9 3 Other work, including work by business professor Robert
Cialdini and law professor Joshua Rosenberg, also presents a number of
ideas to promote tax compliance that are grounded in behavioral
94
insights.
This Article has a more focused goal. It aims to provide a detailed
and specific analysis of salient and influential tactics that might apply to
the self-employed and small business taxpayer segment, and to consider

92. See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax

Enforcement, 108 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 15, 52, on file with author)
(describing goal of targeting tax enforcement and role of accompanying educational campaign).
Some existing pre- and post-filing issue resolution programs at the Large and Midsize Business
(LMSB) division of the IRS, which invite taxpayers to disclose and agree with the IRS on issues
in exchange for resolution of those issues, already invite taxpayers to elect a more cooperative
regime. See, e.g., CLIFF JERNIGAN, CORPORATE TAX AUDIT SURVIVAL 69-78 (2004) (describing

initiatives including pre-filing agreements, industry issue resolution agreements, limited issue
focused examinations, fast track appeals, and the compliance assurance process program).
Participating in these initiatives in at least some cases builds on pre-existing relationships
between taxpayers and IRS auditors or other personnel.
93. See Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 159-65 (detailing recommendations). See also Marjorie
E. Kornhauser, Tax Compliance and the Education of John (and Jane) Q. Taxpayer, 121 TAX

NOTEs 737, 740-44 (Nov. 10, 2008) (outlining several education and media tactics).
94.

See Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values and Principles, in

TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 200 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T.
Scholz, eds., 1989) (recommending tax compliance tools under the six categories: social proof,
commitment and consistency, reciprocation, liking, authority and scarcity); Rosenberg, supra
note 29, at 530-31 (suggesting the use of media, schools and other access points to establish a
positive models for taxpayers and to publicize tax compliance efforts such as whistleblower
programs).
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communication to both determined evaders and good-faith actors. Part
III outlines how more salient and social proof-based communications
about tax evasion could claim the attention of taxpayers and tax
preparers and increase the perception that the government understands
their game and can catch them at it. Part IV sets out several ideas based
on the influence principles of reciprocity, commitment and consistency
which could help initiate and sustain a cooperative taxpayer-agency
relationship.
III. CASH, AUDITS, SHAMING, AND TAx PREPARER DILIGENCE: USE
SOCIAL PROOF AND DON'T BURY THE LEAD

A. Cash
1. Existing guidance lacks salience
Tax evasion by self-employed and small business taxpayers who do
not pay tax on all of their business income contributes half of the tax
gap, and the failure to report cash income contributes significantly to
the shortfall. 95 This group presents a big target audience for persuasive
communications aimed at increasing voluntary compliance. However,
the current communications aimed at them miss the mark.
For example, the first entry in the IRS tax gap fact sheet series, titled
"Business Income and the Tax Gap," begins with six paragraphs of
dense background information about the National Research Program
and the measurement of the tax gap. 96 Not until the second paragraph
of the second section is there this key piece of information: "Small
business owners and self-employed taxpayers must report on their tax
returns all income received from their businesses unless specifically
excluded by law. In most cases, business income will be in the form of
cash, checks and credit card charges." This text is not set off by
emphasized text style, white space or otherwise.
But after this
important message, a bullet list does highlight other, less important
news-that barter, cancellation of debt, damages, kickbacks, and other
more unusual forms of income are also taxable. The fact sheet goes on
to devote a significant portion of its two pages to the calculation of cost
97
of goods sold and the calculation of income.
95. See supra Part I.A (outlining tax gap data).
96. Cf Toder, supra note 1, at 4 (describing the National Research Program).
97. Internal Revenue Serv., Business Income and the Tax Gap, F.S. 2006-20 (June 2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/O,,id=158618,00.html.
An April 2008 Fact
Sheet is similarly dense. See Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Challenges of Business Income, F.S.
2008-20 (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id= 182821,00 html.
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IRS products directed at the self-employed and small business
community similarly focus on the details, offering helpful but dense
information about choosing a tax preparer, social security benefits,
choices among retirement plans, depreciation and so forth. The
products tend to bury information about paying tax on cash income.
Consider this information about the cash method of accounting from a
free calendar the IRS makes available:
Determining gross income with the cash method is merely a matter of
adding up the cash, checks, and fair market value of property and
services you receive during the year. Using this method, your income
for the year includes all checks you receive .... You
cannot avoid tax
98
by not depositing checks or credit card charge slips.
The text zeroes in on a secondary issue: whether you have income
when you receive the check or when you cash it. Perhaps these
materials avoid disagreeable information about paying tax on cash
income because they aim to build a cooperative or responsive regulatory
relationship; perhaps the materials telegraph that the IRS believes that
the user of its free calendar is compliant until proven otherwise. Still,
the materials fail to highlight the most important information; they bury
the lead.
Much IRS guidance aimed at self-employed and small business
taxpayers with significant cash revenue lacks salience. The stylistic
approach of correcting taxpayer misunderstandings about the
requirements of the law obscures the central point. The problem is not
lack of understanding of a complicated legal provision.9 9 The problem
is a norm of not paying tax on cash income.
2. Influential content
A simpler message would have more salience, as would a message
delivered by more easily accessible media, such as video instead of
single-spaced text. Such a message could grab the taxpayer's attention
and cue the decision process that relates to the taxpayer's tax evasion
behavior. Influence principles can help the government determine the
00
content of its message. '
98. See Success by Design: 2007 IRS Tax Calendar for Small Businesses and Self-Employed
(text accompanying the month of February) (on file with author).
99. In contrast, a text-based FAQ approach to disseminating information on complicated
issues that come up in connection with home foreclosure and debt cancellation makes some sense.
See

IRS,

Home

Foreclosure

and Debt

Cancellation, Dec.

11,

2008,

available at

http://www.irs.gov.newsroom/article/0,,id=l 74034,00.html.
100. The IRS might also consider tapping resources such as the Advertising Council, which
donates advertising talent to the cause of public service campaigns. See Seymour H. Fine, A
Generic Social Marketing Plan, in SOCIAL MARKETING: PROMOTING THE CAUSES OF PUBLIC
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In a 1989 paper, Professor Robert Cialdini used his lexicon of

influence principles, including social proof, commitment and
consistency, reciprocation, liking, authority and scarcity, as a basis for
outlining a series of proposals to improve tax compliance. This Part Ell
uses his principle of social proof to outline how the government could
craft a simple and influential message about paying tax on cash income.
Social proof means that we "use the actions of others to decide on
proper behavior for ourselves, especially when we view those others to
be similar to ourselves."10 1 As outlined in Part I, social science work
has shown that social proof is important to tax compliance. Taxpayers'
compliance behavior correlates with the perceived compliance behavior
of peers with which taxpayers self-identify, and some work suggests
that such perceived group norms have not only a correlative
10 2
relationship, but also a causal effect.
The scope of relevant norms, however, is uncertain. Studies agree
that the compliance norm of a taxpayer's small circle is relevant, but
they split on the question of whether the perceived compliance norms of
the broader population are also important. 10 3 For example, in one reallife experiment, 20,000 taxpayers each received a letter from the
Minnesota Department of Revenue explaining that nearly all
taxpayers-ninety-three percent-were compliant. This experiment
tested the impact of information about a general taxpaying public norm,
rather than a small peer group norm. The researchers reported a small,
positive impact on compliance and disagreed about whether the result
had statistical significance. 10 4 In another experiment, UK taxpayers
AND NONPROFIT AGENCIES 289, 298 (Seymour H. Fine ed., 1990) (describing the Ad Council).
101. CIALDINI, supra note 87, at 120.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (discussing the relationship between social
norms and noncompliance). It is possible that tax preparers' norms also have a causal effect on
taxpayers' behavior, although research on this point is mixed. For example, one survey of
Australian taxpayers suggests that taxpayers choose tax advisers whose views are consistent with
the taxpayers' attitudes toward compliance. See Yuka Sakurai & Valerie Braithwaite, Taxpayers'
Perceptions of Practitioners: Finding One Who Is Effective and Does the Right Thing?, 46 J.
Bus. ETHics 375, 385 (2003) (reporting results based on a survey of Australian taxpayers).
Another study suggests that once taxpayers have chosen a tax preparer, they tend to follow the
advice of that tax preparer. See Lin Mei Tan, Taxpayers' Preference for Type of Advice from Tax
Practitioner: A Preliminary Examination, 20 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 431, 445 (1999). This Article
focuses on tactics intended to tap into taxpayer-to-taxpayer small group norms rather than
interactions between tax preparers and taxpayers.
103. See Richardson & Sawyer, supra note 6, at 175-76 (describing literature showing that
income source is an important tax compliance factor).
104. See Marsha Blumenthal et al., Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 125, 130-34 (2001) (reporting
results of the experiment). But see Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance
Experiment State Tax Results 18 (1996), available at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us.legal-policy/
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who received letters from Inland Revenue emphasizing the general link

between taxpaying and citizenship
reported statistically significant
05
higher rates of compliance. 1
One risk of publicizing the compliance behavior of a vast majority of
the taxpaying public is that the audience may interpret the information
to mean that "a clever minority cheats" rather than "virtually no one
cheats." If the audience self-identifies with the clever minority, the
social proof strategy backfires. 10 6 Social proof, then, would not

necessarily endorse a slogan like "90% of Americans Pay Their Taxes.
Put Yourself in the Majority." It prefers the slogan offered by Professor
Rosenberg: "I pay my taxes. Pay yours,"' 0 7 or perhaps the similar
"Don't Cheat Me. Pay Your Taxes." Both of these slogans target the
taxpayer-to-taxpayer norm central to individuals' compliance

decisions. 108
A slogan alone, however, does not offer a complete solution. The
task remains of showing the target audience that similar taxpayers
comply. 10 9 The surest way is to access and change small-group norms.
Although much of the relevant group, by definition, cheats, 1 10 some
research reports/content/complnce.pdf (noting that although a variance analysis yielded no
statistically significant effect, a different test indicated that the letter produced more variance than
would have been expected from a control group; and also noting that the letter produced a greater
uptick in tax compliance than a separate letter linking tax payments to public services and goods).
105. See John Hasseldine et al., Persuasive Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement
Strategiesfor Sole Proprietors,24 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 171, 189 (2007) (reporting compliance
increases for letters that emphasized taxpayer service, letters that emphasized citizenship, and
letters that emphasized enforcement).
106. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 104, at 135 (stating that a statement of high but not
one-hundred-percent compliance "may be interpreted to mean that the revenue department is
unable to detect cheating"); Cialdini, supra note 94, at 214-15 (noting a similar possibility).
107. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 530.
108. See, e.g., Frey & Torgler, supra note 9, at 146, 152 (noting correlation and apparent
causal link between taxpayers' perception of others' compliance and taxpayers' compliance
decisions).
109. Rosenberg proposes a series of television commercials featuring "American hero[es] and
heroine[s]" delivering a similar message. Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 530. Kornhauser
considers a similar celebrity-endorsement proposal. See Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 743
(suggesting that actors might "sell" taxes and public goods as they sell other products). This
approach falls under the "authority" category of influence techniques in Cialdini's lexicon. See
CIALDINI, supra note 87, at 179-84 (considering advertising tactics including the celebrity print
ad campaign developed by a milk industry group). Because the social science research indicates
that taxpayers' close peer groups appear to have the most impact on tax compliance decisions, I
choose here to emphasize the social proof influence tactic instead.
110. See supra Part L.A (presenting data on misreporting by small business and self-employed
taxpayers).
Some such taxpayers apparently cheat more than others.
See GAO SOLE
PROPRIETOR REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting that the upper ten percent of understatements
were much larger on average than the lower half, and accounted for sixty-one percent of all sole
proprietor understated taxes).
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group members do not. One strategy would use an individual easily
identifiable as a self-employed or small business taxpayer who
explained why he or she paid taxes.I1 1 Consider the following script:
I run my own construction business. Sure, I get cash income, but I
pay every dime of my taxes. Why? Well, I think about those teachers
at my kids' school. I know they depend on federal funding. I pay my
taxes. Pay yours.
Scripts might also tap into different public goods in an effort to
describe a commitment perhaps more likely to be shared by the target
audience-although it is important to seriously consider whether the
target audience does in fact value the highlighted public goods. 112 For
example, a script might read, "Every year we pile in the car and go
tenting at a national park" or "My mother couldn't make it without
113
Social Security and Medicare." Others have generated similar ideas.
Alternatively, a communication campaign could call on broader
personal integrity values with lines such as, "It's the honest thing to
do," or "I pay my employees fairly and my suppliers fairly. I'm not
going to cheat the government out of what I owe."' 114 The goal is to
emphasize positive points of similarity between the speaking taxpayer
and the audience.
B. Publicity of Audit and Whistleblower Initiatives
Attention to salience and influence in communications might also
improve audit publicity. The audit rate stands at about 1.03% on

111. Several public interest campaigns have begun to use peer-to-peer Internet strategies to
build social norms. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 180-81 (2008) (describing the strategy of
the Illinois First Person Consent registry designed to build organ donor lists); Donate Life Illinois
Home Page, http://www.donatelifeillinois.org/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2009) (featuring photos and
"stories" of Illinois citizens who have registered as donors).
112. See Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 164 (noting the "grave dangers in linking taxation to
specific expenditures," including the possibility of fostering an exchange view of taxation that
can prompt taxpayers to feel even more strongly that a tax is unfair or that the government wastes
money).
113. See id. at 163-64 (noting the need for more education on the benefits of taxation);
Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 530 ("[B]rief shots of hospitals, schools, roads, jetfighters, people
eating wholesome food, taking safe drugs, etc. could make us understand some of the thousands
of ways that our taxes contribute to our lives in ways we typically ignore.").
114. However, care should be taken when crafting appeals that rely on the fairness of the tax
system. There is a positive correlation between tax compliance and the perceived fairness of the
tax system, see TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, supra note 5, at 127; see also Joel Slemrod, Cheating
Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 39 (2007) (discussing what is

currently known about tax evasion), but an ad strategy that relies on the perceived fairness of the
tax system might backfire if the target audience does not share that perception.
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average for individuals; 1 15 it is so low that even a significant increase of
resources or improved audit selection strategies cannot make an audit
truly likely for self-employed and small business taxpayers. 116 But if
the government could publicize enforcement activities so that the
perceived likelihood of audit increased for sole proprietor taxpayers, it
117
could get more benefit out of an admittedly low audit rate.
This is due to the well-established cognitive availability bias, which
prompts us to estimate the "likelihood of an event on the basis of how
quickly instances or associations come to mind." 118 Availability causes
individuals to overestimate the likelihood of an event occurring to them
if they have recently heard about it happening to someone else. Thus, it
is linked to the indirect audit effect-audits have a positive impact on
tax compliance, in addition to resulting in increased collections from the
19
audited taxpayers. 1
The IRS has made concerted efforts in recent years to improve the
publicity of its enforcement activities. The criminal investigation
division, for example, assigns a publicity point person in every field
office, and the head of the criminal investigation division recently
reported that the publicity rate on sentenced criminal cases had
increased to 78.1% in 2007 from 54% in 2000.120 In addition, the IRS
website publicizes compliance and enforcement news, generally
released in the form of text notices. However, the twenty-one items in
the "Compliance and Enforcement News" section of the IRS small
business and self-employed (SBSE) taxpayer web page as of March
2008 did not include any items referring to the successful audit of a
12 1
small cash business.
The Department of Justice does offer a significant number of taxrelated press releases-more than fifty, for example, for the period May

115. See IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2007, supra note 55, at 3 (listing statistics for individual audit
rates).
116. See supra Part I.C (discussing limitations of increased audit strategies).
117. See, e.g., Andreoni et al., supra note 5, at 846 (summarizing numerous tax compliance
studies that find that a high subjective probability of detection is associated with significantly
more compliance behavior).
118. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 83, at 40 (quoting SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 384 (2d ed. 1991)). See also Jolls et al., supra note 82, at 1537
(noting that salient advertising is persuasive in part because it plays into the availability
heuristic).
119. See PLUMLEY, supra note 52, at 35 (citing estimates of indirect audit effect).
120. See Jeremiah Coder, Conversations:Eileen Mayer, 116 TAX NOTES 738, 740 (Aug. 27,
2007).
121. IRS Compliance and Enforcement News, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/content/O,,id
=137869,00.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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through December 2007.122 Perhaps officials refer to this press release
coverage when they cite their criminal case "publicity rate." The list
includes items featuring small business or self-employed taxpayers or
their preparers, and could be used for a broader press campaign. One
item, for example, reports that "Randy L. Bragg, the operator of
employee leasing company Consolidated Human Resources Arizona,"
pled guilty to criminal charges of failing to pay federal employment
taxes. 123 Another states that "[a] federal judge in Portland, Maine, has
permanently barred Carol East Palesky of Topsham, Maine, from
preparing federal tax returns for others" because she claimed inflated
12 4
deductions and credits for customers.
However, the Justice Department's press releases do not seem to
yield much media coverage. In the Bragg and Palesky cases, for
example, top results from Google searches for the defendant's name
turned up few relevant news stories. The Bragg case prompted one
entry on topix.com/phoenix reporting on his guilty plea. The Portland
Press Heraldpicked up an Associated Press story in August 2007 about
Palesky's criminal charges, and webcpa.com ran a similar story.
A comprehensive survey of media reporting of tax fraud and evasion
is beyond the scope of this Article. But a brief survey of articles posted
by Reuters and U.S. News and World Report over the 12-month period
from May 2007-May 2008 reveals results for "tax fraud" or "tax
evasion" that mainly feature famous people and/or egregious
offenses. 12 5 There may be more reporting of typical tax-evading
taxpayers in local media. 12 6 But overall, it appears the government has
122. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Tax Div., Tax Div. Press Releases 2007,
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/taxpress2007.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2008) (listing 2007 press

releases).
123. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Tax Div., Phoenix Businessman Pleads Guilty to
Charges of Failing to Pay Federal Employment Payroll Taxes (Nov. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv07896.htm.
124. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Tax Div., Federal Court Bars Maine Woman from
Preparing Tax Returns for Others (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/taxl
txdv07990.htm.
125. See, e.g., Barbara Liston, Wesley Snipes Jailedfor 3 Years in Tax Case, REUTERS, Apr.
25, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/peopleNews/idUSN2419088420080426?sp
=true (reporting that actor had earned $38 million but failed to file tax returns from 1999-2001);
Carey Gillam, U.S. Sues Two for Making Millions "Disappear," REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.conlarticle/domesticNews/idUSN2150033920080221 (reporting
allegations that a Kansas City lawyer and accountant had fabricated large deductions and set up
sham companies to further tax fraud schemes for their wealthy clients).
126. See, e.g., Robert E. Kessler, Businessman Gets 6-Month Sentence in Tax Evasion,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 25, 2008, WL 2008 WLNR 7735090 (reporting that the owner of a Long Island
construction business who employed undocumented carpenters and paid them off the books was
sentenced to a $400,000 fine, three years supervised release, and six months residence in a
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not chosen to push a social proof-based campaign featuring owners of
local corner stores and similar local taxpayers.
The government has tried to focus attention on particularly egregious
taxpayers in a categorical way, such as through the IRS "Dirty Dozen"
list and the Department of Justice Tax Defier Initiative. 12 7 These lists
paint a picture of tax evaders more willful than the average small
business or self-employed taxpayer. For example, the IRS list warns of
tax preparers who are "scam artists" and will "skim" taxpayers'
returns. 12 8 The Department of Justice explains that "the tax defier is
someone who rejects the legal foundation of the tax system, despite
decades of legal precedent upholding the system's constitutional and
statutory validity, and who takes specific and concrete action to violate
129
the law."
These approaches, and related tax protestor and other publicity, may
effectively reduce the ranks of determined protestors or "scam artists."
But they lack a social proof link to the experience of small business and
self-employed taxpayers who may simply be in the habit of not
recording how much cash they earned in a particular year and may not
see themselves as tax evaders in the same way tax protestors defending
their home against federal agents are tax evaders. A publicity campaign
featuring more typical taxpayers would have more salience.
A more personal audit publicity campaign directed at less egregious
tax cheating could have a crowding-out effect.1 30 In other words, news
of harsh IRS sanctions might jolt compliant taxpayers out of their
halfway house). Online comments to Kessler's article emphasized the immigration compliance
angle of the story. Tax blogs sometimes pick up this news. See, e.g., Taxable Talk,
http://www.taxabletalk.com/tax-evasion/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2009) (blog of Russ Fox, an
enrolled agent with Clayton Financial in Irvine, Cal., including posts of numerous tax-fraud
tidbits).
127. See IRS News Release IR-2008-41 (Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter IR-2008-41], available
at http://www.irs.gov/newsroomlarticle/0,,id=180075,00.html
("urging" taxpayers to avoid
"schemes" including constitutionally-based tax protestor arguments, hiding income offshore, and
"scam artist" fraudulent return preparers); Press Release, Nathan J. Hochman, Tax Division's
Assistant Attorney General, Announces the Creation of the National Tax Defier Initiative (Apr. 8,
2008) [hereinafter TAXDEF Press Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/
April/08_tax_275.html. See generally Rifkin, supra note 50, at 32 (describing the tax defier
initiative).
128. IR-2008-41, supra note 127.
129. TAXDEF Press Release, supra note 127.
130. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 151 ("The commoditization of a behavior crowds
out positive normative influences on that behavior.") (citing Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk,
Psychological Foundationsof Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687 (2002)); Mark Lubell & John
T. Scholz, Cooperation, Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI.
160, 173-74 (2001); Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision
Frames, and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 684, 691-94 (1999).
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reciprocal tit-for-tat game with the government, and prompt them to
treat the IRS as an uncooperative party from which they should exact
every advantage through economically rational aggressive tax return
positions and audit lottery games. For example, relatively compliant
taxpayers who fail to report some cash revenue might instead adopt
more aggressive evasion strategies involving hiding assets in offshore
accounts 13 1 or tax protestor arguments.
But it seems that the possibility of this shift would be minimized if
taxpayers thought that the publicized sanctions were proportional to the
crime. For example, the government might also counteract any possible
movement of good-faith taxpayers to marginal tax evaders or marginal
tax evaders to dedicated tax evaders by pursuing effective publicity
about all groups' treatment by the government. The government might
portray the good-faith taxpayers as recipients of exceptional service and
respectful treatment. 132 The marginal tax evaders might suffer bad
consequences: monetary civil penalties whose size varies with the
amount and nature of the tax evasion. The dedicated tax evaders should
suffer worse consequences: perhaps even criminal conviction.
A related constraint of an audit publicity campaign is that if the IRS
is perceived by the public to overreach its authority or act in bad faith, it
faces the possibility of public and congressional backlash.1 33 This
happened, for example, in 1998, when public perception of an
overzealous IRS contributed to the passage of a law curtailing the
agency's power. 134 This concern also supports the approach of
publicizing penalties that correspond to the severity of the offense.
A taxpayer testimonial approach might also minimize the chance of
backlash against the IRS by presenting the regrets of audited taxpayers,
rather than the vindicated authority of the government. They might tell
their story for the record as part of a settlement offer. 135 The taxpayer
131. The practice of placing individuals' assets in offshore bank accounts for the purpose of
hiding the existence of the principal and/or income plainly constitutes tax evasion, and the
aggressive use of offshore trusts where individuals retain control of the corpus may as well. See,
e.g., IR-2008-41, supra note 127 (naming "hiding income offshore" as one of the top twelve tax
scams). The consideration of offshore planning techniques used by corporations falls outside the
scope of this article.
132. See Komhauser, supra note 24, at 152 (noting the "crowding-in" effect that procedural
fairness and good examples can produce).
133. Cf Leviner, supra note 25, at 364 ("[Rlare and extreme punishments can provoke
community outrage.").
134. See Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
ParadigmShift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. I, 79 (2004)

(noting debate over "pendulum" swings between service and enforcement at the IRS in the wake
of the 1998 Act).
135. The IRS has occasionally made publicity permission part of a taxpayer settlement. See,
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might explain, "I thought I was doing my family a favor, paid for a trip
to Hawaii by not turning over income taxes to the feds. Now I'm in
debt for five times the cost of the trip."
Some other possible tax gap closing strategies rely, like audit, on the
concept of identifying and disciplining evading taxpayers, without
undermining the compliance behavior of good-faith taxpayers.
Proposals for expanded whistleblower and qui tam provisions 3 6 present
influence challenges similar to those presented by audit publicity. The
goal is to persuade target audience taxpayers that they are really
vulnerable to whistleblower disclosure-without giving the impression
that the IRS is inappropriately mean.
Such publicity campaigns deserve respect as challenging and subtle
exercises. A successful campaign would realistically portray audited
taxpayers sufficiently similar to the targeted group in order to affect the
small-circle social norm that is most closely related to such targeted
taxpayers' compliance behavior.
It would publicize sanctions
proportional to the offense to avoid prompting a congressional
restriction of IRS powers or crowding out compliant taxpayers who
might defect from their pattern of reciprocity with the IRS if they
thought the government acted unfairly. Moreover, such a campaign
must comply with taxpayer confidentiality limitations and budgetary
constraints. Nevertheless, it is likely a worthwhile exercise. The
indirect deferral benefits of an audit can yield many times the tax
revenue resulting from the audit itself 137-but only if people know
about it.
C. Shaming
Another social proof strategy would aim to communicate society's
disapproval of tax cheating, and raise public awareness of the
government's successful efforts to find noncompliant taxpayers, by
publishing the names of delinquent taxpayers or using other shaming
techniques. 13 8 Many states publish such lists, and the U.S. government
has used the technique in certain narrow circumstances. 139 Reputational

e.g.,
IRS
News
Release
IR-2004-151
(Dec.
16,
2004),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroomlarticle/O,,id=132350,00.html ("Hercules [taxpayer] has further
agreed to a limited waiver of the taxpayer privacy and anti-disclosure rules in connection with

this press release.").
136. See supra Part I.D (outlining whistleblower and qui tam recommendations).
137. See PLUMLEY, supra note 52 (describing quantifications of indirect compliance benefits).
138. See, e.g., Jay A. Soled & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., A Little Shame Might Just Deter Tax
Cheaters, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008, at A ll (discussing the benefits of tax shaming strategies).
139. See Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
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sanctions (or the perceived threat thereof) might serve as a powerful
deterrent to cheating for taxpayers or tax preparers, 14 0 although shaming
may most effectively deter those already inclined to comply. 14 1 Put
differently, shaming might facilitate changes in the norm of tax
compliance by encouraging citizens who are susceptible to social
142
influence to gather around an expressed collective norm.
Salient and influential communication could improve a shaming
strategy's effectiveness. For example, a shaming strategy might have
greater social proof influence if it featured certain individuals and
included photos or links to business websites, so long as this approach
were consistent with confidentiality requirements and Constitutional
limitations. 14 3 The idea of featuring individuals has elements in
144
common with the audit publicity proposals discussed above.
However, shaming strategies raise separate concerns unrelated to the
salience and influence of the particular shaming tactic employed. First,
because the government cannot actually identify many underreporting
self-employed and small business taxpayers, any delinquent taxpayer
list would necessarily be incomplete. This could produce a concern
about presenting caught tax cheats as the unfortunate minority and the
vast majority of uncaught tax cheats as free, clear and richer. The
government might hedge against this concern by presenting the list as a
partial list of the tax delinquents it knows about.
In addition, if a shaming strategy produces a public perception that
the government is being mean, it could have an adverse effect on the
overall public perception of the approachability of the IRS, and it could
therefore undermine tit-for-tat strategies directed at good-faith
taxpayers. 14 5 This concern is related to Professor Dan Kahan's
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 863, 913-21 (2004) (noting the federal publication of lists of expatriating individuals and
corporations); Rifkin, supra note 50, at 35 (noting a rule requiring government contractors to
report outstanding tax debt in excess of $3000).
140. See Soled, supra note 62, at 288-90; (noting the potential of shaming techniques for tax
practitioners) (citing Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 1880 (1991)).
141. See Massaro, supra note 140, at 1916-17 (noting that psychological studies demonstrate
that shaming most affects strongly socialized non-offenders).
142. See Kirsch, supra note 139, at 913-21 (considering the expressive function of shaming
on tax compliance norms) (citing Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338 (1997) and Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996)).
143. For example, the government should carefully avoid any appearance of intent to
discriminate. See infra Part V.C (discussing possible equal protection concerns).
144. See supra Part lII.B (discussing audit publicity).
145. See supra text accompanying 130 (discussing possible adverse reactions to
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argument that shaming strategies lack expressive ambiguity, since they
so plainly and strongly communicate strong public disapproval of the
individual shamed. The unambiguous nature of shaming makes it
difficult for individuals with different world views to develop a
consensus that shaming is an appropriate sanction. A "hierarchist," for
146
example, may approve of shaming but an "egalitarian" may not.
If individuals with delinquent tax payments are shamed, and some
good-faith taxpayers, perhaps because of their world views, consider the
shaming sanction mean-spirited, the good-faith taxpayers may move
away from a cooperative relationship with the IRS. At the same time, at
least for individuals who are strongly socialized, shaming may
constitute an effective sanction. 147 The government could mitigate the
crowding-out risk by shaming determined tax cheats only. One might,
for example, post only the names of taxpayers who owed a significant
amount, such as $25,000,148 and had refused to respond to repeated
government inquiries. Still, it is a delicate balance and the crowdingout concern may even exist for shaming techniques that focus on
egregious stories; more limited tactics would still "degrad[e] and
moraliz[e].' 4 9 Perhaps the best course is to research the impact of
shaming sanctions on taxpayer morale-as well as tax revenue-in
those states that have such sanctions before proceeding with a federal
program.
D. Tax PreparerDue Diligence

Salience and influence tactics could also inform the delivery of
guidance about tax preparers' due diligence requirement. As discussed
above, it is currently unclear whether a cash business preparer is
required to inquire extensively about a client's cash income. 150 Perhaps
there is concern that a strengthened diligence requirement could cause
taxpayers to switch to more aggressive preparers, or crowd tax preparers

disproportionately harsh sanctions in the context of audit publicity).
146.

See Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV.

2075, 2090 (2006) (contrasting hierarchists' and communitarians' approval of shaming sanctions
with egalitarians' and individualists' disapproval of them).
147. See Massaro, supra note 140, at 1900-04 (describing the "gravity" and "isolation" of
shame for a person to whom group or community membership is important).
148. Some state websites post taxpayers who owe smaller amounts. Wisconsin, for example,
has a $5000 cutoff. See Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Wisconsin Delinquent Taxpayers,
http://www.revenue.wi.gov/html/delqlist.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2008).

149. Kahan, supra note 146, at 2090.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77 (discussing existing guidance regarding tax
preparer diligence).
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out of the "don't ask, don't tell" category 15 1 and into a situation where
they actively aided and abetted their clients' efforts to evade tax on cash

income. 152
This possibility of taxpayers' or tax preparers' migration between
categories suggests that any attempt to address the problem of "don't
ask, don't tell" preparers should be accompanied by publicity about the
worst adverse consequences that active aiders and abettors can, and do,
suffer. A parallel publicity campaign could emphasize that an active
aider and abettor would face far worse penalties (perhaps criminal
charges) than a don't ask, don't tell preparer who violated the diligence
requirement, while still conveying the information that a don't ask,
don't tell preparer would also suffer painful consequences (perhaps
significant monetary penalties and a loss or suspension of license).
If the IRS decided to clarify and strengthen the diligence
requirement, it faces a communication problem analogous to the
challenge of effectively communicating the simple message that cash is
taxable. Here, the message would be, "Ask about the cash." To
maximize salience and influence, consistent with the social proof
principle, the content of the guidance ought to closely reflect tax
preparers' experience. For example, the IRS might create a video that
shows an interaction between a small business owner and his tax
preparer. It might show a "wrong way" scenario subject to penalties
and license suspension: "So, Joe, I have all the credit card receipts from
your restaurant here. Let me just run through the program [clickety
Then it could
clickety clack], looks like this is the number."
demonstrate a "right way" scenario: "So, Joe, I have all the credit card
receipts from your restaurant here. How about your cash take? What's
the ratio like on most nights?"
E. Content Distribution
There remains the question of how to distribute the content in
taxpayer testimonials or video guidance, whether it relates to cash
revenue, audits, tax preparer diligence or other items. The IRS has
invested heavily in its relationships with industry tax preparer groups,
and those relationships, together with meetings offered by the
government to tax preparers, offer one communication avenue. But the

151. See supra text accompanying note 78 (describing "don't ask, don't tell" tax preparer
behavior).
152. See generally Morse et al., supra note 13, at text accompanying n.67 (suggesting that the
immorality and social disutility of involved preparers is clearer than that of "don't ask, don't tell"

preparers).
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IRS still needs ways to reach individual taxpayers and unaffiliated tax
preparers. Accordingly, mass market distribution may be necessary.
With respect to mass-market distribution, conventional television,
radio, and print advertising can be expensive. 15 3 Research has used

letters from government tax authorities; that is one relatively low-cost
option. But if demographic research confirmed that the target taxpayers

were regular internet users, the cheapest way to distribute content might
be to simply post it on the IRS SBSE page 154 and seek some parallel
media coverage. If the content is effective, it will likely get follow-on
media stories and independent distribution, such as through You Tube,
which the IRS has already used as a video guidance outlet. 155
IV.

TIT FOR TAT, RECIPROCITY, AND COMMITMENT AND CONSISTENCY

A. Why Tit for Tat Needs Help
Advocates of cooperative and responsive regulation envision a tax
system where taxpayers respond with honesty and compliance to a "fair
and respectful" tax administration. 15 6 It is a tit for tat concept grounded
in game theory-taxpayers and tax administrators exchange positive

153. Media outlets such as television stations need not comply with any requirement to donate
time to public service advertisements, but many do so anyway. See THE HENRY J. KAISER
FOUNDATION, SHOUTING TO BE HEARD: PUBLIC SERVICE ADVERTISING IN A CHANGING
TELEVISION WORLD 2 (2008) (explaining that donating time may help non-cable television
stations meet their obligation to act in the "public interest"). Data from 2005 indicate that
broadcast and cable television stations donated an average of seventeen seconds an hour to public
service advertisements. See id. at 5 (citing study results). Some public service campaigns are
fully or partly paid. See id. at 3 (citing federal Office of National Drug Control Policy campaign
as a partly paid program).
154. Internal Revenue Serv., Small Business and Self-Employed Tax Center,
http://www.irs.govlbusinesses/small/index.html (last visited June 25, 2007).
155. In 2008 the IRS posted three thirty-second spots on YouTube explaining how taxpayers
could get their economic stimulus tax rebates and avoid phishing scams in 2007. See Internal
Revenue Service, Get Your Tax Rebate: General Taxpayers, http://www.youtube.comlwatchv=LBfEKCKkSk&NR=l (last visited Feb. 7, 2009); Internal Revenue Service, Get Your Tax
Rebate: Beware of Rebate Scams, http://www.youtube.com/watchv=TUYxAbd7NVo&feature
=PlayList&p=ODI2A5B897BOBDC0&index=l (last visited Feb. 7, 2009); Internal Revenue
Service, Get Your Tax Rebate: Taxpayers Who Normally Don't File, http://www.youtube.coml
watch?v=lRSPwX2kNic&feature=PlayList&p=OD12A5B897BOB
DC0&index=0 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2009). Comptroller of Maryland Peter Franchot also used YouTube to post an engaging
clip intended to encourage e-filing in January 2009.
Maryland Comptroller, Maryland
Comptroller-Taxpayers of Genius, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvbRj-XdhRc (last
visited Feb. 18, 2009).
156. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 89, at 1-11 (describing Australian responsive
regulation model); Leviner, supra note 25, at 371 (describing tit-for-tat strategy); Ventry, supra
note 89, at 445-47 (describing cooperative regulation concept).
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information and reinforce each others' good behavior. 15 7 Under this
model, the government needs opening lines-overtures that
communicate to taxpayers that it is interested in starting cooperative
relationships.
Professor Dennis Ventry, for example, offers several possible
government overtures, including rewarding taxpayer compliance,
offering participation in rulemaking, and giving taxpayers better access
to government information. 158 This Part builds on the idea that the
government should make its willingness to cooperate known using
salient and influential reciprocity tools. Then it considers ways in
which the government could encourage taxpayers to affirm and
strengthen their commitment to tax compliance.
B. Reciprocity
As Professor Cialdini explains, the reciprocity influence principle
describes our compulsion to repay favors and gifts. 159 Reciprocity often
triggers unequal exchanges, so that "[a] small initial favor can produce a
160
sense of obligation to agree to a substantially larger return favor."
Cialdini provides a vivid example of the reciprocity principle when he
describes the behavior of a traveler who is unable to turn away or resist
making a donation when presented with a flower by a Hare Krishna
member at an airport. 161
The IRS already gives taxpayers things for free, such as its numerous
service and outreach products. 162 For example, it has produced a
narrated PowerPoint workshop for small business owners 16 3 and a
"Small Business Resource Guide," 164 each available as a DVD (or CD)
or online, in addition to a wall calendar with important tax dates. 16 5 It

157. See Leviner, supra note 25, at 374 (linking tit-for-tat strategy to game theory).
158. See Ventry, supra note 89, at 445 (suggesting rewards for filing correct and timely
returns and open communication as an initial strategy); id. at 448 (exploring taxpayer input for
rulemaking).
159. CIALDINI, supra note 87, at 20.
160. Id. at 33.
161. Id. at 23 (describing airport incident).
162. Cialdini's reciprocity recommendations focused on possible service and outreach
offerings. See Cialdini, supra note 94, at 212-13 (recommending emphasis of the value of such
services, such as by noting their market price).
163. See Internal Revenue Service, Small Business Products Online Ordering,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=101 169,00.html (last visited June 25, 2007)
(listing Publication 1066C, A Virtual Small Business Tax Workshop (DVD)).
164. See id. (listing Publication 3207, Small Business Resource Guide (CD)).
165. See id. (listing Publication 1518, Tax Calendar for Small Businesses and SelfEmployed).
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also offers a number of hotlines, 166 and annual tax forums at reasonable
prices for tax professionals. 167 This kind of information offering, in
which the IRS has already invested considerable time and energy, may
already trigger a reciprocal reaction that encourages the target audience
to increase their compliance.
Some items,

such as the calendar, 16 8 move away from the

straightforward delivery of information and into the category of classic
reciprocity influence gifts. But these gifts are more complex than the
typical stress ball. Despite efforts to avoid legalese and offer genuinely
helpful information using plain language, the style of the content is
typically dense and complex. 169 Moreover, the IRS delivers bad news:
you have to pay taxes and there are a lot of forms to fill out. 170 The
government could attempt to increase the salience of its offerings by
making their message simpler. For example, it could put a web
address1 71 and a tagline, perhaps a variation of "I pay my taxes. Pay
yours," on some swag.
But there is a problem with swag such as branded stress balls or
magnets, at least based on the anecdotal collection of reactions to these
proposals. The problem is that taxpayers may experience these "gifts"
166. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Hotlines and Toll-Free Numbers,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=161104,00.html (last visited June 25, 2007).
2007,
IRS
Nationwide
Tax Forum
Internal
Revenue
Service,
167. See
http://www.taxforuminfo.com/index.php?module=content&sectionid=13 (last visited June 25,
2007).
168. Even the calendar, however, retains the bland and out-of-touch patina of conventional
public service advertising. Its cover features the only illustration, a drawing of a six-employee
team meticulously coloring in the word "SUCCESS" on a backdrop of rolling golden hills and
blue skies. This likely does not resemble the day-to-day struggle experienced by many small
businesses. Contrast the post office's postcard advertising campaign featuring the hapless
cartoon characters Cathy and Dilbert and the post office's solutions to their shipping woes. Press
Release, United States Postal Service, "Dilbert," "Cathy" Help Postal Service Talk with
Customers, (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.usps.com/communications/news/press/
2006/pr06Ol 4.pdf.
169. See supra text accompanying note 98 (describing IRS calendar content).
170. An entry entitled "Filing Requirements for the Self-Employed" states, dauntingly, "As a
self-employed individual, you may be responsible for completing multiple tax forms, depending
on your type of business." See Internal Revenue Service, Publications and Forms for the SelfEmployed, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=1 15044,00.html (last visited Jan. 22,
2009) (listing nine publications and seven forms that self-employed individuals may have to use).
171. Ideally, the IRS could clean up its web links to the relevant small business page. It has
established the "Small Business and Self-Employed Tax Center" as an index of information, and
this link is featured as a result of a keyword search for "small business," "smallbiz" and "self
employed" (but not "small biz" or "sbse") on www.irs.gov. However, the address for the onestop resource itself is hardly catchy: http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/index.html. Internal
Revenue Service, Small Business and Self-Employed Tax Center, http://www.irs.govlbusinesses/
How about www.irs.gov/smallbusiness, or
small/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
www.irs.gov/smallbiz, or www.irs.gov/sbse?
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as unneeded stuff that the IRS forces them to purchase with their own

tax dollars. Even though private sector firms may pass on the cost of
reciprocity gifts to consumers in the form of higher prices, the coercive
element in taxpayers' obligation to fund the IRS seems to cause adverse
reactions to apparently frivolous increases in the agency's cost base.
Another reciprocity idea follows from others' proposals to offer
rewards or discounts for timely and correct tax filing. 172 The IRS could
offer a coupon, such as ten dollars off your taxes, expiring on the day
your taxes are due. If delivered via a click-through on the IRS website
or offered after the completion of a survey, the strategy would bring in
the commitment and consistency principle as well, because it asks a
73
taxpayer to affirmatively choose to associate with the IRS.1
However, an economic incentive may raise a crowding-out problem
in that it may "commoditiz[e]" the taxpayer relationship and decrease
the positive compliance effect of values like good citizenship. 174 In
addition, the coupon concept at least appears expensive. Even if limited
to Schedule C filers, 175 a ten dollar coupon applied to every Schedule C
return would appear to cost $215 million. 176 A lottery, say for
forgiveness of a year's tax liability, might provide another, cheaper
possibility of delivering money to taxpayers, 177 but this idea, like the
stress balls, could open the IRS to accusations of spending taxpayer
time and money on frivolous ideas.
172. See Ventry, supra note 89, at 445-46 (recommending discounted rates of tax for
taxpayers who pay taxes accurately and on time). See also Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 527-28
(recommending rewards for taxpayers who sign up for automatic reporting).
173. See infra Part IV.C (discussing commitment and consistency).
174. See Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 170 (noting commoditization risk).
175. Such a limitation would presumably pass the applicable constitutional rational basis test.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("In the ordinary case, a law will be
sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems
tenuous."). If viewed as a reduction in otherwise applicable late-filing and other penalties, which
the IRS has the discretion to adjust, see I.R.C. § 6652(e) (2008) (imposing a penalty unless
"reasonable cause" can be shown), it would likely not present a tension with statutory rate
schedules, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (2008) (listing the tax rates for individuals), and Congressional
action would not be required. See I.R.C. § 6652(e) (2008) (allowing the IRS to waive late-filing
penalties for "reasonable cause").
176. See JEFF CURRY & JUSTIN BRYAN, SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP RETURNS, 2005, SOI
BULLETIN, Summer 2007, at 6, 6, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05solep.pdf
(reporting that sole proprietors filed about 21.5 million Schedule C tax returns in 2005). Of
course, the reciprocity idea is that the Schedule C filers who used the coupon would end up
paying more to the government even taking the coupon into account, just as the reciprocity
principle prompts a coupon-using shopper to spend more at the store with the coupon than
without.
177. Like a coupon, the lottery idea could include a commitment and consistency component
if participation in the lottery were linked to a survey on the IRS website.
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If taxpayers perceive traditional swag as wasteful of taxpayer money
and economic incentives as (perhaps) undermining their citizenship
values, how can the IRS use the reciprocity principle to help foster
cooperative relationships with taxpayers without worrying about
backlash? The safe approach is to stick to the project of trying to make
taxpayers' lives easier through service and guidance, and approach the
project with greater sensitivity to the influence principle of reciprocity.
Perhaps more compliant taxpayers could receive better service, for
continue its efforts to make
example. 178 More broadly, the IRS should
17 9
timely.
and
accessible,
simple,
guidance
C. Commitment and Consistency
1. How the IRS Already Uses Commitment and Consistency
Under Professor Cialdini's definition, commitment and consistency
refers to "our desire to be (and to appear) consistent with what we have
already done." 180 This desire ties to our evolved understanding that life
goes better if we honor the commitments we have made to other people,
and it is stronger if our indications of agreement are public. 18 1 Small
18 2
initial gestures can spark a much more substantial involvement later.
The most important difference between a commitment and consistency
strategy and a social proof or reciprocity strategy is that a commitment
and consistency strategy involves the taxpayer's confirming action,
while a social proof or reciprocity strategy can be executed through a
unilateral government communication or gift.
The government already uses tools that invite taxpayers and tax
preparers to confirm their commitment to a tax compliance norm. For
example, taxpayer service programs may succeed in motivating
taxpayers to commit to tax compliance through the semipublic act of
reaching out to the government for help. Two other specific tactics are
requiring signed statements on tax returns, and surveying taxpayers
about their tax compliance beliefs. The government could build on each
of these existing activities in a way that specifically targeted the known
issue of tax evasion by self-employed and small business taxpayers. It
178. See Komhauser, supra note 24, at 170 (suggesting rewards like "special phone lines that
have a shorter wait").
179. See, e.g., supra note 155 (noting 2008 video guidance in relation to economic stimulus
tax rebates).
180. CIALDINI, supra note 87, at 53.
181. See id. at 72-74 (noting the importance of public commitments).
182. See, e.g., id. at 65-66 (noting the substantially increased inclination of individuals who
sign Sierra Club petitions to give money or participate in demonstrations).
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could also attempt to encourage taxpayers' commitment to other public
goods, and then draw the connection between such public goods and the
83
value of tax compliance.]
2. Tax Return Statements
First, consider statements on tax returns. 184 Currently, an individual
taxpayer must sign his or her income tax return, swearing "under
penalties of perjury" that the information reported is complete and
correct. 185 The government also uses this approach to bolster its effort
to keep taxpayers honest by regulating tax preparer gatekeepers: a tax
preparer must sign each tax return he or she prepares. 18 6 From a
commitment and consistency perspective, these signature requirements
may serve as a semi-public statement in support of tax compliance. The
concept is similar to the idea of taxpayers signing an honor code before
187
completing their returns.
This idea of asking taxpayers and tax preparers to sign tax returns
could be more closely tailored to the current tax gap problem. For
example, the government's tax gap data show that Schedule C
misreporting by sole proprietors yields a disproportionate amount of
cheating.1 88 It could accordingly ask each Schedule C taxpayer and tax
preparer to sign a statement on Schedule C stating that reported income
includes all revenue, cash and otherwise, and that deductions are
accurately reported.
One might object that because such a strategy alludes to possible
methods of tax cheating (i.e., not reporting cash revenue) it might
backfire, by prompting a taxpayer to conclude that the smart minority

183. Cialdini, supra note 94, at 209 (proposing a three-step process for a commitment and
consistency tax compliance campaign, consisting of "(a) identifying existing norms/values within
the citizenry that can be conceptualized as related to issues of tax payment; (b) focusing attention
on these norms/values as existing personal commitments and (c) sensitizing the citizenry to the
inconsistency between possessing such personal commitments and failing to be fully tax
compliant").
184. See, e.g., IRS Form 1040 (U.S. individual income tax return containing oath).
185. See id. (relaying an oath that individuals must sign when completing their tax return to
verify the accuracy of their statements).
186. See id. (containing a line for paid preparers to sign). Cf supra note 64 (citing a 2008
budget proposal to increase preparer penalty for, among other things, failing to sign tax return).
187. See Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Daily Life and its Policy Implications, 25 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 117, 123 (2006) ("[T]he IRS could slightly change its forms by making
them more personal or asking people to sign an honor code of sorts before they begin filling out
the forms.").
188. Schedule C lists sole proprietorship business profits or losses. See IRS Form 1040,
Schedule C (titled "Profit or Loss From Business (Sole Proprietorship)").
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reduces taxes by cheating, and that he or she should cheat too. 189 One
could also object that such a tax return statement is inherently suspect as
a true statement of positive commitment, because the enormous
disincentive to state on one's tax return that one does not believe in tax
compliance, and hence invite an audit, makes it easy for a taxpayer to
rationalize her decision to sign as a decision to avoid an audit rather
than a statement embracing tax compliance with which she must then
conform her behavior. 190 If there is sufficient uncertainty about the
likely success of this
strategy, it might make sense to run an experiment
19 1
works.
it
if
see
to
3. Taxpayer Surveys
The IRS Oversight Board conducts an annual telephone survey
through an independent firm, which consistently shows that the vast
majority of Americans think that paying taxes is the right thing to do.
For example, in the 2006 survey, eighty-six percent of respondents said
that it was not acceptable to cheat at all on income taxes, and ninetyfour percent "completely" or "mostly" agreed that "[i]t is every
American's civic duty to pay their fair share of taxes." 192 These survey
193
results agree with other studies done by independent organizations.
However, they contrast with results from various other developed
countries, whose citizens are significantly less likely to think that tax
194
compliance is a moral or civic responsibility.
A survey with the goal of increasing tax compliance through
195
commitment and consistency would target suspected tax cheaters,
189. See supra text accompanying note 106 (discussing possibility of identification with a
clever minority).
190. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 83, at 123-24 (noting that cognitive dissonance
more strongly prompts behavior to change attitude if the subject lacks an independent reason for
the behavior).
191. See infra Part V.A (discussing measurement).
192. IRS OVERSIGHT BD., 2006 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 2 (2007), available at
http://www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/2006-taxpayer-attitude-survey.pdf (charting responses to
various questions posed regarding taxes, whereby eighty-six percent of people surveyed protested
any amount of cheating on taxes, seventy-three percent completely agreed that paying taxes is a
civic duty, and twenty-one percent mostly agreed that paying taxes is a civic duty).
193. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., A BAROMETER OF MODERN MORALS: SEX, DRUGS AND
THE 1040, at 1 (2006) (reporting that seventy-nine percent of survey respondents believed that
"[n]ot reporting all income on your taxes" was morally wrong).
194. See, e.g., James Alm & Benno Torgler, Cultural Differences and Tax Morale in the
United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 243 (2006) (reporting that U.S. citizens
report stronger beliefs that paying taxes is a moral and civic duty compared to citizens from
fourteen European countries).
195. Developing web-based individualization strategies designed to tailor intemet offerings to
individuals' preferences and needs could help in the formulation of a small business-focused
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and make it as easy and attractive as possible for taxpayers to check the
box marked tax compliance. For example, the survey might consist of
only one or two questions and reward the participating taxpayer with a
small prize. 196 An online survey tool could minimize costs.
An anonymous survey would follow the format adopted by the
Oversight Board, which uses an independent firm. This approach is
consistent with research that shows that it is more likely that we will
change our behavior and beliefs to match prior commitments if we lack
an excuse-such as, "I only said that on the poll because I didn't want
the IRS to think I was a tax cheat and audit me." But it is inconsistent
with the principle that a public commitment exerts a stronger pull to
produce consistent behavior.
This problem of anonymity is similar to a problem faced by the
proposal to add signature requirements to Schedule C, in that a public
signed statement, generally the strongest commitment and consistency
tool, may permit the taxpayer to dodge a commitment in the tax
compliance case because it can be explained by the excuse of avoiding
audit. In the case of the signature requirement, it is inevitable that the
IRS will know whether the taxpayer signed the line. In the survey case,
the taxpayers' statements to an independent firm might be public
enough to spark a commitment response, even though they would not be
revealed to the IRS, so that the audit avoidance cognitive excuse would
not be as available to responding taxpayers. But, as discussed in the
section below on measurement, 19 7 another layer of design difficulty is
added by the desirability of matching tax return information with survey
results so as to measure whether the survey tool actually worked.
4. Public Goods Propaganda and Earmarking
Americans' support for the public goods provided by the federal
government might provide another avenue for commitment and
consistency influence to work. World War II propaganda provides a
good example of a tax compliance campaign that emphasized the public
goods provided by the federal government. As Professor Carolyn Jones
survey or other strategy, if consistent with taxpayer confidentiality and the government's interest
in keeping the information on its website open to all without the need to, for example, enter a
username and password. See WARD A. HANSON & KIRTHI KALYANAM, INTERNET MARKETING

E-COMMERCE 131-38 (2007) (describing authentication, association, and interaction
elements of a web-based individualization strategy).
196. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 83, at 122-23 (reviewing experimental literature
showing that smaller prizes can foster more acute cognitive dissonance between stated beliefs and
previous attitudes, prompting a change in attitude to conform to the stated belief and resolve the
cognitive dissonance).
197. See infra Part V.A (discussing measurement issues).
AND
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has related, President Roosevelt and his Treasury Secretary, Henry
Morgenthau, regarded the project of persuading Americans to pay their
19 8
taxes as akin to the project of convincing them to buy war bonds.
They used techniques including radio ditties, pamphlets and posters, and
Donald Duck cartoons, and prompted taxpayers to demonstrate their
patriotism by properly filing their taxes.
With a majority of American voters calling for withdrawal of U.S.
troops from Iraq, 19 9 the Donald Duck cartoon does not directly translate
into a good current support-the-war-effort ad campaign. Indeed, the
New Yorker ran a cover in April 2007 that showed 1040s and other
familiar tax forms folded into paper airplanes and tanks, which
illustrated that emphasizing federal spending can result in dissatisfied
20 0
taxpayers unhappy with how the government spends tax revenue.
But even if defense spending is not popular, other federal spending
might be. Perhaps we would feel more positive about paying taxes if
we imagined those dollars going to preserve national parks, maintain a
federal highway we rely on, or provide the Social Security benefits that
offer some subsistence to the elderly.
A public goods campaign presents the challenge of selecting a level
of generality when describing the public goods. Should the campaign
highlight a good that target taxpayers are thought to value highly, in an
effort to increase the salience of the communication? Or should it
appeal more generally to the value of unspecified public goods? 20 1 In
addition, a public goods campaign that aims to take advantage of the
commitment and consistency principle of influence must include a way
for taxpayers to publicly affirm that they value the public goods (or at
least some of them) supplied by the government and accordingly pay
their taxes willingly, perhaps even with pride.
One real-world experiment has tested the ability of a public goods
appeal to improve taxpayer compliance. 20 2 In its 1995 study, the
Minnesota Department of Revenue sent 20,000 taxpayers a letter
explaining that "your income tax dollars are spent on services that we
198. See Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propagandain the Expansion
of the Income Tax During World War 11,37 BuFF. L. REV. 685, 687-88, 699-703 (1989)

(describing the tax propaganda campaign).
199. See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs770/iraq-war-five-year-anniversary (Mar. 19, 2008) (reporting that
fifty-four percent believe that the decision to enter the war in Iraq was wrong).
200. Christoph

Niemann,

T-Day,

NEW

YORKER,

Apr.

9,

2007,

available at

http:llwww.newyorker.comlmagazine/toc/2007/04/09/toc-20070402.
201. See Komhauser, supra note 24, at 164 (noting the pitfalls of focusing on specific public
goods).
202. See Coleman, supra note 104, at 5 (discussing the Minnesota survey).
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Minnesotans depend on." 20 3 The letter mentioned important services
including law enforcement, parks, and highways. 20 4
Taxpayers
receiving the letter submitted tax payments exceeding those of a control
group by about 0.8% of average income, but the results were not
statistically significant.20 5
The Minnesota study included fairly broad descriptions of public
goods, but it is not clear that factor led to the lack of a statistically valid
result. Other factors such as the salience of the letter format may have
had relevance. In addition, the study did not ask taxpayers to take any

action demonstrating their commitment to tax compliance.
One way to finesse the conflict between making a salient
communication about relevant public goods and avoiding alienating
taxpayers who do not care for the identified good is to have the
taxpayers confirm their commitment to a good of their choice. For
example, the government could permit taxpayers to earmark a small
portion of their tax payments for projects they support. 20 6 It could also
20 7
invite taxpayers to create their own tax compliance content.

203. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. Id. The letter stated in part: "Over 30 percent of state taxes go to support education.
Another 18 percent is spent on health care and support for the elderly and the needy. Local
governments get about 12 percent of the state tax money, supporting services in your community
such as law enforcement, parks, libraries and snow removal." Id.
205. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 104, at 125, 128, 131, 134, 137 (describing the study
and results).
206. See IRS Form 1040 ("Check here if you, or your spouse if filing jointly, want $3 to go to
this fund"). The federal government currently allows earmarking up to $3.00 per individual
taxpayer for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. Id. See also Cialdini, supra note 94 at
210 (considering the possibility of allowing earmarking for a fund to combat tax cheating).
California takes a different approach: if a Californian wishes to add to his or her tax bill, he or she
may pay extra to support one of fifteen funds ranging from the California Sea Otter Fund to the
Alzheimer's Disease/Related Disorders Fund. See State of California Franchise Tax Board Form
540, available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2008/08-540.pdf (listing various funds that can be
donated to under a "Contributions" section).
207. There is some precedent. In 2007, TurboTax sponsored a tax rap video contest, which
included an original Vanilla Ice clip, resulted in the submission of 370 homemade rap videos
through YouTube, and garnered more than 2.5 million views. See Press Release, BusinessWire
EON, "It's Just a Breeze" Delivers 25 Gs!: Grand Prize Winner Takes Home $25,000 in
TurboTax TaxRap Contest (Apr. 14, 2007), available at http://www.prweb.com/releases/intuit/
turbotax/prweb518806.htm (discussing a contest where TurboTax gave away money to the best
"homemade rap video"). The IRS could sponsor a contest with a subject like "Don't Cheat Me."
And the Tax Foundation announced a similar video contest to raise awareness of the high U.S.
corporate tax rate and its impact on global "competitiveness."
See Press Release, Tax
Foundation, Win $5,000 in the Tax Foundation's CompeteUSA Video Contest (Sept. 10, 2008),
available at http://www.taxfoundation.orglpress/show/23592.html (discussing a contest where the
Tax Foundation awarded money to videos aimed at raising "awareness of America's high
business tax rates and how those taxes have an impact on our competitiveness, wages, and living
standards").
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V. COMPLICATIONS

A. Measurement and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Adding salience and influence to the reporting, audit, and other
strategies already populating the tax gap toolbox raises a cost-benefit
question: which strategy will make the most progress in closing the tax
gap at the least cost? 20 8 As to costs, although they should be quantified
and budgeted, many of the strategies, including audit and other
publicity, and the taxpayer survey idea, could be executed with
relatively modest investment, so long as the IRS website and direct mail
or email are used as the main avenues of content distribution. A
handful of employees could create and post a testimonial video or run a
survey. Other ideas would cost more. A ten dollar coupon applied to
the tax return of every Schedule C filer appears more expensive-about
$215 million-although this figure does not account for the increases in
tax payments prompted by the coupon reciprocity strategy. The upfront
costs of a lottery could be less expensive.
As to benefits, because noncompliance by self-employed and small
business taxpayers produces such a large tax revenue shortfall,
strategies that succeed in increasing compliance only modestly could
have a significant positive revenue effect. Moreover, the strategies
described below might help to measure the impact of different influence
programs so that the government could direct resources at the most
promising ideas. In addition, testing and measuring strategies could
minimize the possibility that a message or method backfires and
worsens the public perception of the IRS or target taxpayers' inclination
to comply.
20 9
One measurement approach would examine actual filed returns.
For example, the IRS could distribute the social proof testimonial
approaches described above 2 10 by email or direct mail to a sample
group of Schedule C filers; initiate a relationship of reciprocity with a
sample group by sending a sample group a gift;2 1 or, with the help of
tax software companies, allocate forms to some taxpayers forms bearing
additional signature lines on Schedule C while giving other taxpayers

208. See Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 323, 352-53 (2007) (setting forth principles including understanding the target
audience, hiring creative professionals, developing a brand, and using peer focus testing groups).

209. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 104, at 128-30 (outlining experiment design).
210.
211.

See supra Part III.A (describing testimonial strategies).
See supra Part IV.B (describing reciprocity strategies).
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forms with no additional signature lines. 2 12 In each case, compliance
could be measured based on actual tax returns filed.
Other tactics, notably commitment and consistency approaches such
as surveys and contests, depend on participation by the taxpayer. 2 13 It
would be more difficult to tie the results of such tactics to filed tax
returns, because, in order to do so, taxpayers who voluntarily respond
would also need to provide their taxpayer identification number or
similar information. 2 14 In addition, taxpayers who participate may be
taxpayers who are more likely to pay their taxes in the first place,
creating a thorny bias problem.
Measuring compliance based on actual tax returns filed would
generate satisfying empirical data, but it would be slow. 2 15 Focus group
measurement could provide a quicker response, and focus groups could
help develop the message while providing useful data about the likely
success of the campaigns. 2 16 For example, one might survey group
members before and after viewing advertising content relating to cash
income, audit publicity, or tax preparer diligence, or before and after
responding to surveys about their tax compliance views.
B. Politics
Could legislation directing the IRS to use influence tools to increase
tax compliance achieve a positive revenue score, and therefore a boost
in the legislative process? Lawmakers sometimes subtly delegate
spending increases to administrative agency action to keep them out of a
budget process constrained by PAYGO rules. 2 17 These rules consider it

212.
213.
214.

See supra Part IV.C.2 (describing tax return signature strategy).
See supra Part IV.C (describing commitment and consistency strategies).
The success of phishing scams provides some evidence that taxpayers would readily

supply IRS with their personal information. See IRS, BEWARE OF PHISHING SCHEMES (2008),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4523esp.pdf (warning taxpayers about potential
identity theft emails and phone calls). But the taxpaying public may also become more concerned
about the risks of identity theft. See, e.g., id. (exemplifying the warnings that the IRS is
publishing).
215. See Blumenthal et al., supra note 104, at 131-32 (reporting 1995 data in 2001). The
researchers in the Minnesota study, for example, published their results in 2001, six years after
1995, when the letters were sent and the related tax returns filed. Id.
216. Testing through peer focus groups has been called a "best practice" of public service
advertising. See Medill, supra note 208, at 353 (recommending that public service ad campaigns
"use[] peer focus groups to test the target audience's reaction to various marketing messages").
217. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 530-36 (1998) (citing the example of language
in a 1993 Congressional report that implicitly urged the Treasury to adopt hedging regulations
permitting ordinary loss rather than capital loss treatment in the wake of Arkansas Best Corp. v.
Commissioner,485 U.S. 212 (1988)).
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out of order 2 18 to present a measure that increases a budget deficit or
decreases a budget surplus. 2 19 Because administrative regulatory action
affects the baseline for the analysis of the impact of a piece of
legislation on the budget, an administrative tax cut does not require
220
reconciliation under the PAYGO rules of the budget process.
Moreover, a later legislative endorsement of an administrative position
is also costless under PAYGO, because the previous regulatory action
22 1
will already have been incorporated into the baseline.
The potential use of influence strategies by the IRS to help close the
tax gap presents the opposite problem. Revenue increases resulting
from an IRS decision to adopt one or more influence strategies would
generally not yield revenue-raiser credit under PAYGO, although they
provide a politically attractive way to pay for other policies without
raising taxes or violating PAYGO.2 22 If Congress wished to count the
revenue and receive some credit for a stepped-up program of influence,
it might need to change the method of computing revenue raisers and
losers. Non-substantive provisions with significant compliance power,

218. See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative
Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 880-81 (2002) (explaining the workings of procedural budget
reconciliation rules, including the process for waiving such rules).
219. PAYGO rules were reinstated by the newly installed Democratic House in January 2007.
See Lori Montgomery, House Adopts Pay-as-You-Go Rules, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2007, at A4
(characterizing rules as targeting deficit spending). A similar Senate bill introduced by Majority
Leader Harry Reid in January 2007 did not pass. See Restoring Fiscal Discipline Act of 2007, S.
10, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing "[t]o reinstate the pay as you go requirement"). The House
rule specifies that the House Committee on the Budget determines the impact of proposed
legislation on the budget deficit or surplus using CBO baselines as a starting point. See H.R. Res.
6, 110th Cong. § 405 (2007).
220. See Garrett, supra note 217, at 535 (describing ordinary loss hedging regulations as "a fix
that for budget purposes was free"). Regulatory actions are incorporated into the baseline score
used by the Congressional Budget Office "[i]f it is clear, under current law, that an action will
take place." Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Hon. John M. Spratt
Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Budget 2 (May 2, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.govl
ftpdocs/80xx/ doc8O6O/05-02-LetterOnRegs.pdf.
They are not incorporated "if it appears
unlikely that an action will take place or that it will have any significant budgetary effect." Id.
Infrequently, a regulatory action may be discounted, for example by fifty percent, if "it is unclear
whether there will be an action." Id.
221. See Garrett, supra note 217, at 535 (noting that a legislative response to litigation
claiming the invalidity of the ordinary loss hedging regulation would not produce a revenue loss
for budget purposes).
222. See Edmund L. Andrews, Democrats Seek Unpaid Taxes, Inviting Clash, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2007, at Al (reporting the response of Senator Max Baucus, chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, to one set of Treasury proposals aimed at the tax gap, which estimated to
generate less than $10 billion annually). Senator Baucus stated: "I know they can't recover every
dollar of the tax gap, but the I.R.S. needs to make an aggressive effort, and an honest one. ...
Treasury shouldn't lowball their estimate." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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such as e-filing requirements 223 and information sharing, 224 typically
earn a zero revenue score.
C. Nondiscrimination
The strategies proposed in this Article would acknowledge that
taxpayers are behavioral creatures, not rational individuals. This
presents a tension with government actors' obligation to treat all
citizens-or taxpayers-equally. 225 Behavior is influenced by different
factors for different people, and protected classifications such as race
226
and gender are surely among the most powerful influence factors.
Consider the social proof strategies outlined in Part III above. One
might execute these tactics-whether applied to honest cash business
taxpayer testimonials, audit publicity, or tax preparer diligence guidance
-through a spokesperson who belonged to the same demographic
group, as organized by type of business, location, race, religion, gender,
socioeconomic grouping, and so forth. This presents at least three
concerns.
First, the designers of a campaign must research and choose the right
demographic. Second, there are likely to be quite a few appropriate
demographics. Third, this kind of approach involves a certain degree of
stereotyping which the government might find awkward.2 27
For
example, a social proof testimonial campaign that featured a female
manicurist and a male construction contractor, each explaining why
they paid their taxes, might tap into de facto labor force splits,
increasing the strength of the social proof strategy, but might also create
the impression that the government endorses those splits, and the wage
gaps that accompany them.

223. See 2009 BLUEBOOK, supra note 42, at 75 (giving a "[n]o revenue effect" score for a
proposal to require e-filing for large organizations).
224. See id. at 78 (giving a "[n]o revenue effect" score for a proposal that would improve
computerized data matching abilities by providing employment data to the IRS and permitting the
IRS to share data with the NDNH-National Directory of New Hires).
225. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (equal protection clause).
226. Cf Kornhauser, supra note 24, at 166 (considering public service campaigns that target
specific markets with forms that "match the target audience in language and media use").
227. Absent an intention to discriminate or a focus on members of a protected class, however,
the use of social proof advertising strategies should not violate the equal protection clause. See,
e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976) (validating, in the absence of other
evidence of an intent to discriminate, a written police test that had a disparate impact on blacks in
that a disproportionate number of blacks failed to pass the test); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs for Port of New Orleans, 309 U.S. 552, 564 (1947) (upholding licensing scheme that,
through its apprenticeship requirement, favored pilots who were related to or friends of existing
pilots).

HeinOnline -- 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 529 2008-2009

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

An influence campaign would have to navigate between the
importance of tapping into salient influence factors for its target
audience and the risk that a campaign that recognizes racial, gender,
age, socioeconomic, and other differences in its audience may have the
appearance of discrimination. But it is possible to transcend the
stereotyping problem. The advertising industry has developed the art of
offering images with which many different audience members can
connect. 2 28 The potential of salient and influential communication
could make the effort worthwhile.
CONCLUSION

Salient communications and greater attention to principles of
influence would better target the existing norm of tax noncompliance
among small business and self-employed taxpayers.
Salient and
influential communications could also enhance existing strategies for
closing the tax gap, including third-party reporting, audit, and
gatekeeper proposals. This Article has described social proof strategies
that would improve the relevance and power of government
communications about taxpayers' obligations to pay tax on cash
income, the risk of audit, and the due diligence requirements for tax
preparers. It has also outlined how the influence tools of reciprocity and
commitment and consistency could help launch a cooperative tit-for-tat
partnership between taxpayers and tax administrators. Though the
prospect of improving the salience and influence of IRS interactions
with the taxpaying public involves complications, policymakers should
make use of this powerful category of tools in their effort to close the
tax gap.

228. See Medill, supra note 208, at 353 (noting the success of "stark, graphic images about
death and disease caused by tobacco usage").
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